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Access to credit in particular and capital in general is a major determinant of the 
rate of both the formation and survival of small businesses. During the last thirty 
years a growing body of theoretical and empirical research has developed that 
explores how a firm’s access to credit varies by the business owner’s race and/or 
ethnicity and test specific hypotheses about why these variations might occur.  
The overwhelming majority of empirical studies show that on average African-
American and Hispanic borrowers receive credit in amounts and on terms less 
favorable than those obtained by non-minority borrowers.  Much of this research 
asks, “does racial discrimination in part account for the observed disparities in 
credit outcomes for various racial and ethnic groups?”  
 
While numerous studies have tested for the existence of discrimination in 
commercial bank lending to firms, to date, this author has found only two 
empirical studies that explore how access to trade credit varies with the race 
and/or ethnicity of a firm’s owner.  This study begins the process of addressing 
this gap in the literature.  This study explores if and how the amount of trade 
credit obtained by small businesses varies by the owner’s race and/or ethnicity.  
Our findings clearly shows that firms owned by African-American men, Hispanic 
white men and Asian-Americans on average receive significantly lower levels of 
trade credit relative to those owned by non-Hispanic white men.   After controlling 
for industry, the owner’s human capital, the creditworthiness of the firm and the 
firm’s owner, this study finds no statistically significant evidence that the 
race/ethnicity of a firm’s owner explains the observed disparity in the levels of 
trade credit provided to firms owned by Hispanic whites and African-Americans.  
For firms owned by Asian-Americans, this study does find statistically significant 
evidence that race explains in part the observed disparities after controlling for 
industry, the owner’s human capital, the creditworthiness of the firm and the 
firm’s owner.  This finding is noteworthy because many scholars suggest that 
Asian-Americans do not experience difficulties in accessing credit comparable to 
those experienced by other minorities. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine if and how the amount of trade credit 
obtained by small businesses varies by the owner’s race and/or ethnicity.   Trade 
credit can be defined as the “credit extended by a seller who does not require 
immediate payment for delivery of a product” (Elliehausen and Wolken 1993, pg. 
1).   “[Both] trade and bank credit are critical sources of funding for small firms 
because they are primary sources of working capital” (Chant and Walker 1988, 
pg. 861).    
 
Access to credit in particular and capital in general is a major determinant of the 
rate of both formation and survival of small businesses (Bates 1993, pg. 41; 
Bates 1997; Christopher 1998).   During the last thirty years a growing body of 
theoretical and empirical research has developed that explores how access to 
credit varies by owner’s race and/or ethnicity and test specific hypotheses about 
why these variations might occur.  The overwhelming majority of empirical 
studies show that on average African-American and Hispanic-American 
borrowers receive credit in amounts and on terms less favorable than those 
obtained by non-minority borrowers.  Much of this research asks, “does racial 
discrimination in part account for the observed disparities in credit outcomes for 
various racial and ethnic groups?”  This widespread interest in discrimination is a 
direct consequence of the role of race in U.S. history.  As recently as the early 
1960s (less than fifty years ago), substantially all financial institutions in the 
South and many in the North, Midwest and West actively discouraged the 
patronage of Blacks and Hispanics (Lemann 1991, pg. 314).   
 
To date, due to the availability of bank loan data and the interest of both bank 
regulators and various communities of color in the quantity and type of credit 
facilities (mortgages, business loans, credit cards, etc.) provided to communities 
of color, there exists a sizeable body of research examining how access to bank 
credit varies by owner’s race and/or ethnicity.  That said, most of the existing 
studies focus on home mortgages.  Up until 1995, banks were only required to 
collect and publicly disclose details about residential mortgage loans and 
borrowers in a fashion that allowed researchers to test hypotheses about the 
existence of racial/ethnic discrimination.  Only recently, have lenders begun to 
provide similarly detailed data for other types of loans (e.g. business loans). 
 
Since 1997, an increasing number of empirical studies have focused on small 
business lending, a direct outgrowth of changes in the Community Reinvestment 
Act (“CRA”) adopted in 1995.  Under the modified CRA provisions adopted in 
1995, banks with assets totaling more than $250 million or affiliated with a 
holding company with more than $1 billion in total assets are required to report 
small business and small farm loans to their primary regulatory agency (e.g. 
Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve, etc.) commencing in 1996 
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(Squires and O'Connor 2001, pg. 3).   This newly available category of data has 
allowed researchers to test for the existence of discrimination in small business 
lending.  This new stream of data is important because access to credit (both 
bank and trade credit) is major determinant of the rate of both formation and 
survival of small businesses. 
 
While the numerous studies have tested for the existence of discrimination in 
commercial bank lending, to date, this author has found only two empirical 
studies that explore how access to trade credit varies with the race and/or 
ethnicity of a firm’s owner (Coleman 2003; Aaronson, Bostic et al. 2004).  And, 
neither of these two studies was designed to determine if any observed 
disparities in trade credit usage between non-minority- and minority-owned firms 
was a function of discrimination.  This study begins to address this gap in the 
literature. 
 
Specifically, this study tests for differences in the amount of trade credit obtained 
by minority-owned1 versus non minority-owned firms after controlling for 
creditworthiness. 
 
Trade credit refers to the informal credit extended to a firm when a supplier of a 
firm provides goods or services and allows payment at a later date.  So, if Maytag 
delivers a truckload of washers to Home Depot at the beginning of a month and 
allows Home Depot to pay for that delivery thirty days later, Maytag has provided 
trade credit to Home Depot for that month. 
 
As the preceding example illustrates, ‘trade credit’ arises as a result of a supplier 
providing raw materials, parts, supplies and/or finished goods to another firm (a 
customer) and allowing the customer to pay at some later date (e.g. 30 days after 
                                            
1 In this publication, the term ‘Minority’ refers collectively to African-Americans, Hispanics whites 
and Asian-Americans.  While we include observations for American Indians and Native Alaskans, 
these groups are not of primary interest for the purposes of this study.  The results for American 
Indians and Native Alaskans are not discussed because the dataset used for this research 
contains too few observations for either group to be statistically useful.  While observations for 
Asian-Americans are included and discussed, several studies argue convincingly that Asian-
Americans do not experience difficulties in accessing capital comparable to those experienced by 
African-Americans and Hispanics Chen, G. M. and J. A. Cole (1988). “The myths, facts, and 
theories of ethnic, small-scale enterprise financing.” Review of Black Political Economy 16(4): 5-
9. 
Bates, T. (1989). “The changing nature of minority-owned business: a comparative analysis of 
Asian, nonminority, and Black-owned businesses.” Ibid. 18(2): 25-42. 
Bates, T. (1993). Major Studies of Minority Business: A Bibliographic Review. Washington D.C., 
University Press of America, Inc. 
Bates, T. (1993). Banking on black enterprise. Washington DC, Joint Center for Political and 
Economic Studies. 
Bates, T. (1997). Race, self-employment, and upward mobility: an illusive american dream. 
Baltimore, MD, John Hopkins University Press. 
Christopher, J. E. (1998). “Minority business formation and survival: evidence on business 
performance and viability.” Review of Black Political Economy 26(Summer (1)): pp. 37-73.. 
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shipment).  From the perspective of the firm receiving the goods, the amount of 
‘trade credit’ provided is the purchase price of the shipment and equals the 
amount of the associated ‘Account Payable’ due to the supplier.  From the 
perspective of the supplier, the amount of the trade credit extended to the 
customer is the amount billed for that shipment and equals the amount of the 
‘Account Receivable’ due from the customer. 
 
Given limited access to the capital markets, small firms2 depend heavily on trade 
and bank credit to meet their credit needs. 
 
“Primary and secondary money and capital markets often pose 
insurmountable financial and regulatory barriers to small businesses and , 
therefore, trade and bank credit become primary sources of working 
capital. . . . Therefore, because traditional capital and money markets are 
often not accessible to small businesses, small firms have a substantial 
demand for short-term credit and bank credit” (Chant and Walker 1988, 
pg. 861). 
 
So, understanding if and how access to trade credit varies with the race of a 
firm’s owner is central to the issue of minority business development. 
 
In the next section, we identify and discuss the specific research questions 
addressed by this study. 
                                            
2 The U. S. Small Business Administration defines a firm as a small business if it employs less 
than 500 workers.  As of December 31, 2002, there are less than thirty African-American-owned 
firms that employed 500 or more workers in all of the U.S. Dingle, D. T. (2003). B.E. 100s 
Overview: Reinvention through Innovation. Black Enterprise. 33: pp. 94 - 106..  In other words, 
substantially all African-American-owned businesses meet the SBA’s definition of a ‘small 
business.’ 
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2. The Research Question 
 
While trade credit in an important source of financing for small businesses, little 
is known about how discrimination might impact access to trade credit for 
minority-owned firms.  This study begins the process of addressing this issue. 
 
This study examines two separate bodies of research and combines them to 
create a platform for considering a new question that to date has not been 
addressed: “Is there empirical evidence of racial discrimination in the extension 
of trade credit?” 
 
The first of these two bodies of research seeks to identify the factors that 
determine who receives trade credit (Emery 1984; Walker 1985; Chant and 
Walker 1988; Elliehausen and Wolken 1993; Peterson and Rajan 1997; Ng, 
Smith et al. 1999; Wilson 2002).  The second body of research seeks to 
determine if there is evidence of racial and/or gender discrimination in various 
credit markets (e.g. mortgage loans, consumer loans, etc.) (Becker 1971; 
Peterson and Peterson 1981; Handy and Swinton 1984; Ando 1988; Elliehausen 
and Lawrence 1990; Bates 1993; Dymski 1995; Munnell, Tootell et al. 1996; 
Bates 1997; Bates 1997; Kijakazi 1997; Blanchflower, Levine et al. 1998; Bostic 
and Lampani 1999; Immergluck 1999; Coleman 2000; Han 2001; Squires and 
O'Connor 2001; Cavalluzzo 2002).   
 
 
2.1.   Hypotheses 
 
Based on a review of these two bodies of literature, a model has been crafted 
that allows us to address the basic research question.  Specifically, the quantity 
of trade credit supplied to a firm is a function, F, of several characteristics of the 
firm in question: 
  
(Quantity of Trade Credit supplied to a firm)  = F(U, I, R). 
 
Where,  
 
I. Creditworthiness (U).  To some extent, all credit providers use some combination 
of quantitative and qualitative data about a prospective borrower to assess the 
creditworthiness of a prospective borrower.  We include variables that measure 
the following: age of the firm; legal form of organization; the firm’s total assets; 
and, the owner’s human capital and creditworthiness. 
II. Industry (I):  Controlling for creditworthiness, the terms and quantity of trade 
credit supplied vary significantly from industry to industry (Ng, Smith et al. 1999, 
pp. 1117-1119).  That said, within an industry, the terms of trade credit are 
generally quite uniform (Chant and Walker 1988, pg. 864; Ng, Smith et al. 1999, 
pp. 1117-1119).  
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III. Race/Ethnicity (R).  The purpose of this study is to determine if race is a 
significant factor in determining the quantity of trade credit supplied. 
 
A review of the two bodies of literature suggests that the relationship between the 
dependent variable and the independent variables can be modeled by a logistic 
regression model of the following form: 
 
iii
i
i RU
D
D εβββ +++=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
− 2101ln    where, 
 
1) D i is dummy variable that identifies the level (high or low) of trade credit supplied 
to firm “i” at time “t” 
 
2) β1 is the coefficient for the creditworthiness vector.  It should be noted in the 
actual model several variables are included to control for creditworthiness.  
These variables are identified and discussed in some detail in the Methodology 
section of this paper. 
 
3) β2 is the coefficient for the dummy variable used to capture the impact of race.  It 
should be noted that in the actual model two dummy variables are included that 
we might distinguish between the Hispanics and African-Americans.  These 
various racial/ethnic categories are discussed in more detail in the Methodology 
section of this paper. 
 
4) εi is the stochastic error term of the ith observations. 
 
Specifically, this study tests two hypotheses: 
 
1) Is race a significant determinant of trade credit?  In other words, is the 
coefficient associated with the race variable (β2) significant?  The study 
uses the Small Business Finances3 dataset for 1998 to test this 
hypotheses. Formally, the Null and Alternative hypotheses would be 
stated as follows: 
 
 
2) Has the importance of race declined over time?  Using the Survey of 
Small Business Finances datasets for 1993 and 1998, we can generate 
                                            
3 The Survey of Small Business Finances has been co-sponsored by the Board of Governor of 
the Federal Reserve (the “Federal Reserve”) and the U. S. Small Business Administration and 
each dataset includes data collected from more than 3,000 firms that were selected to provide a 
representative sample of the population of small businesses in the U.S.  To date, there datasets 
for the years 1987, 1993 and 1998.  For a more detailed discussion of these datasets see pages 
51 through 58. 
0: 20 ≥βH
0: 2 <βAH
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estimate logistic regression models for each period.  By comparing the 
results for these two set of cross sectional data, we can see if there is a 
significant difference in the coefficient associated with the race variable for 
the two periods.  Formally, the Null and Alternative hypotheses would be 
stated as follows: 
 
 
 
2.2.   Limitations 
 
i. Because of the relatively small number of minority-owned firms 
included in the various industry sub-samples of the dataset, this study 
must content itself to examine one sample that includes firms that fall 
into five broad industry groupings: construction; manufacturing; retail; 
transportation and, wholesale (Cole and Wolken 1995, pp. 630-633).   
Observations contained in the dataset for firms in the financial sector 
and service sector were excluded:  services (SIC 7000-8000); and, 
finance, insurance and real estate (SIC 6000 – 6999).   Observations 
for firms with no industry classification were also excluded. 
ii. Given the 1993 and 1998 SSBF datasets only includes a small number 
of firms owned by minority women, only observations for male-owned 
firms were examined for this study. 
iii. Ideally, when testing for decreases in the level of discrimination from 
1993 to 1998, it would be preferable to have panel data.  
Unfortunately, the cross-sectional SSBF datasets were not constructed 
to ensure that observations for the same firms are included in both the 
1993 and 1998 datasets. 
 
 
93,298,20 : ββ >H
93,298,2: ββ ≤AH
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3. Review  of Literature 
 
For more than thirty years, empirical researchers and mainstream 
microeconomic theorists have debated a question with important public policy 
implications: “Does racial discrimination exist in various credit markets?“  The 
fact that this important question remains unresolved reflects three factors worth 
noting: (a) the availability of appropriate empirical data; (b) the difficulty of 
distinguishing between ‘statistical’ discrimination and ‘prejudicial discrimination; 
and, claims of specification bias (specifically omitted variable bias). 
 
Prior to 1987, the kind of empirical data needed to adequately address this 
question was not generally publicly available.  During the period from 1987 
through 1997, several appropriate datasets became publicly available (e.g. CRA, 
HMDA and SSBF).  Since 1987, with increasing frequency, empirical researchers 
have found substantial disparities in either the quantity and/or terms of credit 
extended to minorities versus non-minorities.  When presented with these 
disparities, many mainstream theorists have offered one of two explanations for 
these reported disparities: (a) these disparities could evidence statistical 
discrimination rather than prejudicial discrimination; or, (b) these disparities 
reflect the omission of some important independent variable(s). 
 
The increased availability of appropriate datasets since 1987 increased both the 
fervor and number of scholars engaged in this debate between empirical 
researchers and theoreticians.  Given the central role of data in this debate, it will 
prove helpful to organize the review of empirical studies by major datasets.  That 
said, in the beginning, before the data, there was theory.  And, there we shall 
begin. 
 
 
3.1. Theoretical Literature on Discrimination in Credit Markets 
 
The theoretical framework for examining discrimination in various credit markets 
was derived from the work of Gary Becker.  Becker developed theoretical models 
for studying discrimination in labor markets (Becker 1971).   
 
Today, theoreticians generally acknowledge the existence of two types of 
discrimination: taste (prejudicial) discrimination and statistical (economic) 
discrimination.  Becker’s initial work focused on prejudicial discrimination.  
Neoclassical theoreticians in large measure have developed models that explore 
the possibility of prejudicial discrimination.  When we speak of prejudicial 
discrimination, we mean that individuals or firms have a taste for discrimination 
(similar to having a preference for chocolate ice cream rather than vanilla).  Employing 
conventional neoclassical theoretical logic, theoreticians generally have 
concluded that prejudicial discrimination will not exist in a competitive market in 
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equilibrium.  In contrast, theorists generally have concluded that statistical 
discrimination can exist in a competitive market in equilibrium. 
 
The second type of discrimination (statistical) is the primary focus of a newer 
school of economic thought known as the ‘Economics of Information.’  The 
fundamental insight of this school of economic thought rests on the observation 
that securing information about market participants entails costs.  More 
specifically, it may be more costly to obtain information about some market 
participants than others.  In such instances, group membership may prove a less 
costly (albeit imperfect) substitute for elements of information about the 
performance of some market participants.  It then follows from conventional 
neoclassical theoretical logic that any disparity between groups that might result 
from such a practice would tend to lower costs of a firm or individual engaged in 
that practice.  Such a practice is referred to as ‘statistical discrimination.’  Thus, 
disparities between various groups can exist in a competitive market in 
equilibrium, even without racial prejudice. 
 
3.1.1. Neoclassic al Theoreticians and Prejudicial Discrimination 
 
All of the theoretical work that examines the operation of prejudicial 
discrimination in labor, consumer and credit markets builds on the work of Gary 
Becker, a Chicago School economist (Becker 1971).  Becker’s initial work 
involved the development of theoretical models for studying discrimination in 
labor markets.  Becker reasoned that an individual has a taste for discrimination 
if she acts as if she were willing to either pay something or forego income to be 
associated with some people rather than others.  Becker attempted to isolate and 
quantify the cost of the taste for discrimination by defining a ‘discrimination 
coefficient.’  One example of a discrimination coefficient is the factor that 
quantifies the differential in the wage rate paid to a member of an un-favored 
group versus a member of a favored group assuming equivalent levels of 
relevant skills. 
 
Employing conventional neoclassical logic, Becker argues that in competitive 
markets, eventually market forces will eliminate prejudicial discrimination.  
Becker outlines in some detail how market forces operate to eliminate 
discrimination under both perfect and imperfect competition. 
 
One easily can outline how this would occur in practice.  Assume there is one 
non-discriminating employer in a market, that employer will replace white workers 
with equally qualified (but cheaper) black workers thus lowering the firm’s 
expenses vis-à-vis its competitors. 
 
In a competitive market characterized by decreasing or constant marginal cost, 
Becker argues that the firm with the smallest discrimination coefficient would 
have the lowest unit cost, thus, allowing it to undersell firms with a higher 
discrimination coefficients.  Over time, the firm with the least ‘taste’ for 
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discrimination would undersell more and more firms and capture more and more 
market share.  Eventually, the firm with the smallest discrimination coefficient in a 
market would produce the total market output.  If one firm has a discrimination 
coefficient of zero, all other things being equal, the discrimination coefficient for 
the entire market eventually would shrink to zero. 
 
Becker also argues that at equilibrium the market’s discrimination coefficient 
could also equal zero in an imperfectly competitive market if the following three 
assumptions hold: 
1) one or more firms in the market has discrimination coefficient of zero; 
2) assets can easily be transferred from one market participant to another; 
and, 
3) the capital markets are characterized by perfect competition. 
 
All other factors being equal, a firm with a high discrimination coefficient would 
have higher costs and lower profits relative to other firms.  Let us call this firm 
‘Company D.’ The owners of Company D could increase their return on 
investment by selling the operation to another firm with a lower discrimination 
coefficient.  Further, if the owners of Company D do decide to sell, they could 
maximize their return by selling to the firm with the lowest discrimination 
coefficient (‘Company A’) because that firm would make the highest offer.  
Company A will make the highest bid because all other things being equal 
Company A will have the lowest costs and the highest return on assets.  Thus, 
whether a labor market is perfectly or imperfectly competitive, if at least one 
market participant has a discrimination coefficient of zero, then at equilibrium the 
market discrimination coefficient would also be zero. 
 
While neoclassical theorists uniformly subscribe to Becker’s models for perfectly 
competitive markets, there was and is less coherence regarding the disposition 
of discrimination in imperfectly competitive markets.  The work of Alchian4 and 
Kessel is emblematic of the reasoning of those theorists that questioned the 
applicability of Becker’s model to imperfect markets (Alchian and Kessel 1960).  
Like Becker, Alchian and Kessel reasoned that discrimination is costly, not only 
for those discriminated against, but also for those who discriminate.  Thus, they 
                                            
4 Alchian also used the analysis of property rights to explain the incidence of 
discrimination. Alchian was himself subject to discrimination as an Armenian.  
Alchian and Kessel argued that discrimination would be more prevalent in situations 
where those who discriminate do not bear much of the cost from doing so.  Alchian 
and Kessel used this analysis to explain why regulated utilities discriminated against 
Jews and why labor unions discriminated against blacks. This analysis explains why 
Alchian has never trusted government—but has trusted free markets—to reduce 
discrimination Alchian, A. A. and R. A. Kessel (1960). Competition, Monopoly, and 
the Pursuit of Money. Aspects of Labor Economics: a conference of the Universities-
National Bureau Committee for Economic Research. N. B. o. E. Research. Princeton, 
NJ, Princeton University Press. 14: pp. 349. 
Liberty Fund, I. (n.d.). www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Alchian.html, Liberty Fund, 
Inc. 2003.. 
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concluded that discrimination would be more prevalent in markets where firms 
that discriminate do not suffer much of the cost of doing so.  Following that logic, 
Alchian and Kessel reasoned that the government regulation of certain 
imperfectly competitive product markets may prove conducive to prejudicial 
discrimination.  Like Becker, they argued that a for-profit firm whose profits are 
subject to government regulation would see the cost of discrimination in the form 
of lower profits; however, a firm whose profits were limited by rate of return 
regulations and that was already at the limit would face no cost from 
discriminating.  Government regulation typically protects firms from competition, 
while simultaneously it set prices at levels designed to preclude excessive rates 
of return (as cited in Elliehausen and Durkin 1989, pg. 94).  Alchian and Kessel 
suggested that in an imperfectly competitive market subject to public regulations, 
the constraints on permissible levels of profitability may lower the effective cost of 
indulging in prejudicial discrimination; and, therefore, encourage the practice. 
 
In the final analysis, Alchian and Kessel reasoned that the constraints on the 
permissible levels of profitability frequently associated with public regulation may 
preclude firms with lower discrimination coefficients from making large enough 
bids to persuade the owners firms with higher discrimination coefficients to sell 
their firms. 
 
In general, credit markets in the U.S. are highly regulated.  Public regulations 
control the chartering and licensing of most financial institutions (e.g. commercial 
banks, finance companies and various thrifts).  In addition, regulations 
designating an institution’s service area and the size and types of loans that a 
given institution may provide serve as potent barriers to entry, exit and 
participation in the various credit markets.  Applying Alchian and Kessel’s model 
to credit markets, one might reasonably conclude that given the various 
imperfections that characterize most credit markets, a creditor with a taste for 
discrimination might be able to indulge this taste with minimal impact on the 
firm’s profitability and market share; and thus, the discrimination coefficient of a 
such a firm might not decrease over time as Becker’s work would suggest. 
 
“Monopolists who appear to be too profitable are likely to face pressures 
to reduce prices; and consequently may prefer to take potential excess 
profits in nonpecuniary forms which can be treated as costs.  In the credit 
area, creditors with even a small taste for discrimination might be induced 
to ignore profitable loans to unfavored groups and to prefer loans to more 
marginal risk among favored classes” (Elliehausen and Durkin 1989, pg. 
94). 
 
That said, Alchian and Kessel did not focus on credit markets.  Richard Peterson 
and Carol Peterson, were among the first to employ Becker’s theoretical model 
as a framework for investigating possible discrimination in consumer credit 
markets (Peterson and Peterson 1981; Elliehausen and Durkin 1989).  Like 
Becker, the Petersons focused only on prejudicial discrimination.  Building on 
Becker’s work, they argued that a lender with a taste for discrimination would 
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demand a higher return and/or a lower risk profile from a member of an un-
favored group versus a member of a favored group.  Specifically, the Petersons 
reasoned that a discriminating creditor would apply more stringent underwriting 
criteria and offer less favorable credit terms on loans granted to members of an 
un-favored group versus members of a favored group.  Like Becker, the 
Petersons reasoned that even if some lenders have a taste for discrimination, 
market forces would act to shrink or eliminate equilibrium discrimination 
coefficients of market participants over time. 
 
To summarize, neoclassical theoreticians uniformly agree and argue that even if 
many firms operating in a ‘near-perfectly’ competitive market have a taste for 
discrimination, competition in the market will eliminate prejudicial discrimination 
over time.   This unanimity among neoclassical theoreticians dissolves when the 
focus shifts to markets characterized by increasing degrees of imperfection.  
Some neoclassical theoreticians have argued that in highly regulated markets 
(e.g. credit markets) a firm with a taste for discrimination might be able to indulge 
this taste with minimal impact on the firm’s profitability and market share; and, 
therefpre, the discrimination coefficient of a such a firm might not decrease over 
time as Becker’s work suggest. 
 
Neoclassical models are characterized by two other important limitations that 
should be noted.  First, neoclassical models do not quantify the time period 
required to eliminate prejudicial discrimination from a market.  If the time periods 
are long because competitive forces work slowly, then firms with a taste for 
discrimination may survive for a long time before their market share and 
profitability erode sufficiently to drive them out.  Second, neoclassical models do 
not offer reasons for the existence of prejudicial discrimination which is costly to 
those who practice it. “Costly preferences for discrimination are simply postulated for 
theoretical purposes, and their implications are explored, leading to the conclusions that 
markets will eliminate such tastes” (Elliehausen and Durkin 1989, pg. 95).  While 
the neoclassical models do not address the reasons for discrimination, another 
school of thought does: the information-cost school.  The proponents of this 
school argue that sometimes firms engage in discriminatory practices because it 
can reduce costs.  The next section provides a brief overview of the major 
findings of the information-cost school. 
 
 
3.1.2. The Economics of Information and Statistical Discrimination 
 
Above, we juxtaposed the ‘information-cost’ and the ‘neoclassical’ schools of 
thought.  This is a bit misleading.  Information-cost models are best understood 
as variants of neoclassical thought that have been informed by the framework 
and logic of game theory (Bierman and Fernandez 1993).  All information-cost 
models attempt two tasks: (1) to characterize the type, timing and quality of 
information available to various classes of market participants; and, (2) to predict 
the behavior of these classes of participants as each market participant attempts 
to optimize his/her risk-adjusted return.  While the information-cost models 
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developed for various credit markets generally acknowledge that there may be 
significant disparities in the terms and/or quantity of credit extended to various 
racial/ethnic groups, these models all suggest that these disparities reflect 
statistical rather than prejudicial discrimination.  Statistical discrimination can 
occur in many different settings and markets (product, labor, etc), but we will 
confine our discussion to credit markets and offer a description relevant only to 
those markets.  Statistical discrimination, sometimes referred to as economic 
discrimination, occurs when a creditor uses a credit applicant’s race (or some 
other protected characteristic – age, gender, etc.) as a proxy for measures of 
creditworthiness that cannot be directly observed. 
 
The information-cost models may be seen as a logical extension of the work of 
Alchian and Kessel, as opposed to Becker.  All of the information-cost models 
acknowledge that credit markets are characterized by a number of imperfections 
and thus, may operate stably over long periods of time at interest rates other the 
Walrasian equilibrium interest rate5.  In other words, equilibrium interest rates in 
credit markets tend to be below the market clearing rate. 
 
Today, many financial markets theorists recognize that credit markets cannot be 
usefully modeled as ‘perfectly competitive markets.’  Credit markets deviate from 
the specifications of a perfectly competitive market in three important ways. 
 
“Credit is not freely available at the equilibrium rate of interest . . . . 
[because credit markets are] characterized by non-simultaneous 
exchange and the existence of imperfect and costly information. . . 
In perfectly competitive markets, goods and money are exchanged 
simultaneous and perfect information exists.  However, in financial 
markets, the required [assumption] of simultaneous exchange is violated 
by the nature of the transaction itself.  When money is borrowed today, it 
is exchanged for a promise to repay the note in the future” (Nesiba 1996, 
pg. 60). 
 
As stated by Nesiba (1996), the first of these three imperfections observed in 
credit markets is that the prevailing interest rate consistently falls below the 
‘Walrasian’ equilibrium interest rate (i.e. the interest rate at which the quantity of 
loan funds demanded equals the quantity of loanable funds supplied).  Therefore, 
                                            
5 A Walrasian Economy is a decentralized market economy characterized by price-taking 
consumers and firms and the private ownership of capital and labor, which operates in a such a 
fashion that the following things are true: (1) property rights are well established and costlessly 
enforced; (2) potentially disruptive behavior such as incorrect expectations, the breaking of 
contracts, theft, power struggles, and status competition is not permitted; (3) all consumers are 
maximizing their utility; (4) all firms are maximizing their profits; and, (5) all markets clear.  The 
level of supply and demand for various economic factors where conditions 3, 4, and 5 are true are 
referred as the Walrasian equilibrium. The Walrasian equilibrium interest rate would be the rate 
for capital in a credit market in an Walrasian economy where conditions 3, 4 and 5 were true 
Tesfatsion, L. (2003). Walrasian Equilibrium: A Critique, 
www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/wal604.pdf. 2003.. 
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credit markets are characterized by credit rationing because the quantity of loan 
funds demanded exceeds the quantity of loanable funds supplied.  After we 
discuss the other two imperfections inherent in credit markets, we will return to 
the topic of credit rationing.  
 
The second imperfection is the lack of simultaneity inherent in a loan transaction.  
The creditor advances funds to a borrower today in exchange for the borrower’s 
promise to pay in the coming months or years. 
 
The third imperfection of credit market deals with the distribution of information 
among market participants.  In a perfectly competitive market, information is 
costless and equally available to all participants.  Many of the proponents of the 
information-cost school begin “with a particular assumption of asymmetric 
information (i.e. borrowers have better information about the value of the property 
being purchased and their likelihood of repayment than do lenders) (Nesiba 
1996, pp. 60-61).” 
 
The existence of asymmetric information gives rise to two concerns that 
ultimately explain why credit is rationed (i.e. why prevailing interest rates in credit 
markets fall short of Walrasian equilibrium interest rates).  The two concerns are 
adverse selection and adverse incentives. Adverse selection impacts which 
credit applicants are in the loan portfolio (composition), whereas, adverse 
incentives (moral hazard) influences the behavior of those already in the loan 
portfolio (Nesiba 1996, pg. 61).  The concept of adverse incentives is linked to 
the notion of ‘moral hazard.’  An example of the type of action that invites moral 
hazard is the rescue operation carried out by U.S. Government to address the 
1994-1995 Mexican currency crises.  Such actions can encourage risky lending, 
if lenders know that in case of serious problems they will not have to take losses. 
 
Having introduced the concepts of adverse selection and adverse incentive, let 
us return to the topic of credit rationing (the first credit market imperfections).  
Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) offer an explanation for the existence of credit rationing 
by examining the relationship between adverse selection, adverse incentives, 
interest rates and underwriting risk (Jaffee and Stiglitz 1990).  Ultimately, Jaffee 
and Stiglitz show that a credit market in equilibrium may be characterized by 
credit rationing.  Their argument can be summarized as follows: A lender 
providing a loan cares about the interest rate he/she receives on the loan and the 
riskiness of the loan.  However, the interest charged may itself affect the 
riskiness of a lender’s loan portfolio by either: 1) sorting potential debtors 
(adverse selection); or, 2) affecting the actions of debtors (the incentive effect).   
The relationship between adverse selection and the interest rates charged rests 
primarily on one assumption: those willing to pay high interest rates may, on 
average, be either involved in or proposing riskier transactions.  In other words, 
as the interest rate rises, the average riskiness of transactions increases, 
possibly lowering the bank's profits (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, pp. 408-409).  
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Now, let us turn our attention to adverse incentives.  Another way of talking about 
the 'incentive effect' is 'moral hazard.'   Moral hazard occurs when party "A" (one 
of two parties to an agreement) can and does engage in reckless behavior 
unobserved by the other party (Party "B") to the agreement and that behavior 
can significantly and negatively impact the payoff of party "B."  The authors 
argue that the risk of moral hazard increases as the interest rates charged 
increase.  For example, raising the interest rate on debt employed to finance a 
project reduces the borrower’s net return on a project ceteris paribus, thereby 
encouraging borrowers to undertake projects with higher returns on investment (if 
they succeed) but a lower likelihood of success (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, 408-
409; Jaffee and Stiglitz 1990, pp. 858-859). 
 
Jaffee and Stiglitz built on a model that Stiglitz & Weiss developed and described 
in 1981.  Specifically, Stiglitz & Weiss crafted a model that explains racial 
disparities in the mortgage markets as a function of statistical discrimination as 
opposed to prejudicial discrimination.  The model begins with seven specific 
assumptions: 
  
1) The credit market is characterized by asymmetric information (the borrowers 
know the expected return and risk of their project, whereas the lender knows only 
the expected return and risk of the average project associated with a particular 
group).   
2) Racial prejudice by bankers does not exist (i.e. no banker has a 'taste' for 
discrimination).   
3) The market contains an array of deals with varying risks and expected rates of 
return.   
4) All projects associated with a group have the same expected rate of return; 
however, the risk may vary (and the risk can be quantified).   
5) Lenders have a "bank optimal" interest rate (r*) at which they maximize their 
return.  Exceeding this bank optimal rate exposes the lender to increased losses 
as result of adverse selection and moral hazard, thus reducing the bank's rate of 
return. 
6) There are n distinguishable groups of borrowers each characterized by 
different expected return functions. 
7) Even if two of more groups of borrowers have equal expected rates of return, 
the average variance of returns (measure of risk) of the projects for each group is 
unique. 
 
Stiglitz and Weiss’ major findings follow: 
 
If the risk-adjusted interest rate for a particular (racial) group’s projects exceeds 
the bank optimal interest rate, credit rationing may occur such that member of 
that group will not receive access to credit until another group's credit needs are 
first met.  In the most extreme case, a bank may set a 'bank optimal" interest 
rate, which prohibits lending to a particular group because the interest rate is set 
lower than the bank's required return for that particular group.  In short, loaning to 
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member of that group is too risky given the "bank optimal" interest rate (Stiglitz 
and Weiss 1981). 
 
In contrast to models of Stiglitz and Weiss, Stiglitz and Jaffee, and Becker, the 
work of Guttentag and Wachter and of Lang and Nakamura focus on the spatial 
manifestation of discrimination, redlining.  Strictly speaking, ‘redlining’ refers to 
the practice by mortgage lenders of identifying an area within which they would 
not extend credit.  In the past, some mortgage lenders traced on a map the 
boundaries of an area within which they would not lend with a red crayon or pen, 
giving rise to the term ‘redlining’ (Guttentag and Wachter 1980, pg. 11). 
 
In current parlance, the term (redlining) is used to describe the practice by 
mortgage lenders of penalizing mortgage applicants from a designated area, 
without regard to an individual applicant’s creditworthiness.  The importance of 
redlining is a direct result of the persistence of de facto residential and social 
segregation between non-minorities and minorities.  Dymski offers a more 
precise formulation: 
 
“[Imagine that a lender serves two communities X and Y; the occupants of 
X are primarily African-American and the occupants of Y are primarily 
White.]  . . . redlining occurs when the probability of financing a residential 
transaction in X is lower than in Y, with all economic factors held 
constant, or when borrowers face more stringent terms on a residential 
transaction in X than if the same transaction were made in Y” (Dymski 
1995, pg. 40). 
 
Guttentag and Wachter (1980) developed an argument that attempts to explain 
how redlining might persist in a credit market.  At the onset of their argument, 
they divide redlining into two broad categories: irrational and rational redlining.  
Irrational redlining is synonymous with prejudicial discrimination, and Guttentag 
and Wachter assume that the combination of competitive market forces (per 
Becker) and activism on the part of affected communities would eliminate 
irrational discriminatory redlining.  Given that assumption, they focus their energy 
on trying to explain how ‘rational’ redlining might persist in credit markets.  
Rational redlining is synonymous with statistical discrimination. 
 
Guttentag and Wachter argue that redlining results from coordination failures 
among lenders (Guttentag and Wachter 1980, pg. 1).  Their argument rests in 
part on two related observations: 
 
? In part, the value of housing in a given area is a function of the collective 
willingness of lenders to provide mortgages in that area. 
? The riskiness of any given loan held by a lender is a function in part of the 
willingness of other lenders to provide mortgages in the area where that 
particular borrower resides. 
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Thus, it can be said that lenders are engaged in a ‘coordination game,’ where 
their payoffs (returns) depend in part on their success in anticipating and 
adopting the same strategy as the other ‘players’ in the game (Bierman and 
Fernandez 1993, pp.202-204).  The Guttentag and Wachter model can be 
summarized as follows. There are two neighborhoods, X and Y, and there is a 
lender with no information about the actual risks and returns of providing credit in 
either neighborhood.  This lender will gather “information [about credit 
applications] up to the point at which its anticipated marginal gain from 
information-gathering equals its marginal cost”  (Dymski 1995, pg. 48).  If this 
lender anticipates that other lenders will be more inclined to provide loans for 
transactions in neighborhood Y versus neighborhood X, then the lender might 
reason that the risk of lending in neighborhood Y might be lower than that 
associated with neighborhood X, ceteris paribus.  As this kind of reasoning 
repeats itself, it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.  As a result, neighborhood X is 
redlined  (Guttentag and Wachter 1980, pp. 7-9). 
 
Like Guttentag and Wachter, Lang and Nakamura also offer a theory that 
attempts to explain how redlining might persist in a credit market. 
 
The model developed by Lang and Nakamura (1993) begins with two specific 
assumptions: 1) asymmetric information results from the home appraisal 
process; and, 2) racial prejudice by bankers does not exist (i.e. no banker has a 
'taste' for discrimination).  
 
Like Guttentag and Wachter, Lang and Nakmura’s model rests in part on two 
related observations: 
? In part, the value of housing in a given area is a function of the collective 
willingness of lenders to provide mortgages in that area. 
? The riskiness of any given loan held by a lender is a function in part of the 
willingness of other lenders to provide mortgages in the area where that 
particular borrower resides.   
 
Lenders are continually engaged in the process of determining the true values of 
the homes that serve as collateral for mortgages.  Estimates of values must be 
made.  Since estimates are noisy, the more transactions (housing sales) in a 
particular neighborhood ceteris paribus, the more accurate a lender’s estimates 
of true home values in that neighborhood.  Thus the Lang and Nakmura argue 
that: if there have been more housing sales in neighborhood Y compared with 
neighborhood X, the estimates of value (housing appraisals) for neighborhood Y 
will be more accurate than those for neighborhood X ceteris paribus.  As a result, 
a lender will require higher down payments to compensate them for the greater 
risk (lower quality estimates) associated with mortgage requests from 
neighborhood X, ceteris paribus.  This, in turn decreases the number of sales in 
the neighborhood X and further reinforces the lending bias toward neighborhood 
Y which is perceived as lower risk because of the higher quality of collateral 
estimates (Lang and Nakamura 1993, pp. 225-231). 
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To summarize, if banks do little lending in low-income and minority 
neighborhoods, their estimates of housing values in these areas will be less 
accurate.  As a result, they will require higher down payments and/or higher 
interest rates to compensate them for the greater risk (lower quality estimates) 
associated with mortgage requests from those neighborhoods.  This in turn will 
decrease the number of sales in the low-income and minority neighborhoods and 
further reinforce the lending bias toward neighborhoods that already receive 
credit and are perceived as lower risk because of the higher quality of collateral 
estimates. 
 
Table 1 (page 20) summarizes the three Information-Cost school models of 
discrimination that were discussed in the proceeding pages and the major 
elements of each of the models. 
 
Dymski outlines a unified model that explains both discrimination against 
applicants based on race or ethnicity and redlining.  Thus, this model intends to 
supercede the models of Becker, Stiglitz and Jaffee, Stiglitz and Weiss, 
Guttentag and Wachter, and Lang and Nakamura.  Ultimately, Dymski’s model 
rests on the observation that labor markets, credit markets and the process of 
wealth accumulation are inextricably intertwined6.  According to Dymski, labor 
markets, credit markets and the process of wealth accumulation are 
interdependent because “creditworthiness rests on borrowers’ overall economic 
capacity, and hence depends on outcomes in all other markets” (Dymski 1995, 
pg. 50). 
 
Dymski’s model can be summarized as follows: we have a population that 
consists of blacks and whites, where most of the whites reside in area Y and 
most of the blacks reside in area X.  Let us assume the blacks are subjected to 
prejudicial discrimination in labor markets or in the markets that they engage in 
as entrepreneurs; and this discrimination impinges on their ability to earn income 
in any of the following ways: 
 
a) Blacks earn lower wages than whites in the labor market; 
b) Blacks receive lower earnings than whites when they are self-employed; 
c) More black than whites work as entrepreneurs, and the variance for 
entrepreneurial earnings is greater than that for wages. 
 
Collectively, these forms of earned-income discrimination indicate that on 
average blacks have poorer prospects for future earnings than whites.  One 
implication of this differential in future earnings prospects is that likelihood of 
                                            
6 It should be noted that Becker recognized the interdependence of labor and capital markets and 
employs that relationship to explain how market forces would eliminate prejudicial discrimination 
over time in an imperfect competitive market Becker, G. S. (1971). The economics of 
discrimination. Chicago, University of Chicago. 
Elliehausen, G., E. and T. A. Durkin (1989). “Theory and Evidence of Impact of Equal Credit 
Opportunity: An Agnostic Review of the Literature.” Journal of Financial Services Research(2): 
pp. 89-114.. 
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default on a mortgage loan is higher for blacks than whites with identical earnings 
levels and employment histories.  That said, even if lenders do not engage in 
prejudicial discrimination, they may engage in statistical discrimination which 
constrains the amount credit available to blacks relative whites, due to prejudicial 
discrimination in other markets like the labor markets.  To ‘equalize’ the risk-
adjusted return between black and white borrowers, lenders may require higher 
interest rates and/or downpayments from blacks relative to whites (Dymski 1995, 
pp. 50-52).   
 
Over time, the higher interest rates and/or downpayments will reduce demand for 
mortgage loans, constrain the number of homes sold and limit the appreciation of 
home values in area X, where most of the blacks reside, relative to area Y, where 
white reside, ceteris paribus.  The sale of a home is one of the principal means 
by which individuals realize wealth.  So, over time, discrimination in the mortgage 
markets can contribute to differentials in wealth between blacks and whites. 
 
Finally, Dymski also considers a scenario in which racial income prospects are 
assumed to be the same for both blacks and whites; however, on average, 
whites inherit more wealth than blacks do.7  One implication of this differential in 
wealth holdings is that likelihood of default on a mortgage loan is higher for 
blacks than whites who have identical earnings levels and employment histories.  
Ultimately, the effects of differential wealth holdings on blacks in the credit 
market are the same as those of differential earned income.  To ‘equalize’ the 
risk-adjusted return between black and white borrowers, lenders may require 
higher interest rates and/or downpayments from blacks relative to whites (Dymski 
1995, pp. 53-54). 
 
To summarize, Dymski’s model addresses both prejudicial and statistical 
discrimination.  His model predicts that if either lenders or white homeowners 
have a ‘taste’ for discrimination, discrimination may appear and persist in credit 
markets.  Turning to statistical discrimination, the Dymski model suggests that if 
there are racial differentials in either income or wealth, discrimination may appear 
and persist in credit markets (Dymski 1995, pp.57-61). 
 
 
3.1.3. Summary of Theoretical Literature on Discrimination 
 
Before we begin our discussion of empirical research, a brief summary of the 
theoretical literature might be helpful.  Theoreticians generally acknowledge the 
existence of two types of discrimination: taste (prejudicial) discrimination and 
statistical (economic) discrimination.  When we speak of prejudicial 
                                            
7 Both Conley and Oliver and Shapiro present compelling quantitative data that on average 
whites inherit more wealth than blacks do Oliver, M. L. and T. M. Shapiro (1997). Black Wealth / 
White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality. New York, Routledge. 
Conley, D. (1999). Being Black, living in the red: race, wealth, and social policy in America. 
Berkeley, CA, University of California Press.. 
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discrimination, we mean that individuals or firms have a taste for discrimination.  
Employing conventional neoclassical theoretical logic, theoreticians generally 
have concluded that prejudicial discrimination will not exist in a competitive 
market in equilibrium.  The second type of discrimination (statistical) is the 
primary focus of a newer school of economic thought known as the ‘Economics 
of Information.’  The fundamental insight of this school of economic thought rests 
on the observation that securing information about market participants entails 
costs.  More specifically, the cost of obtaining information about market 
participants may vary from one person to another or one group to another.  In 
such instances, group membership may prove a less costly (albeit imperfect) 
substitute for elements of information about the performance of some market 
participants.  It then follows from conventional neoclassical theoretical logic that a 
firm or individual engaged in the practice of using group membership as a proxy 
for types of information that might be costly to obtain otherwise would tend to 
lower their costs compared with those who do not engage in this practice.  Such 
a practice is referred to as ‘statistical discrimination.’  Thus, disparities between 
various groups can exist in a competitive market in equilibrium, even if no market 
participant engages in prejudicial discrimination. 
 
Finally, many financial markets theorists acknowledge that credit markets cannot 
not be usefully modeled as ‘perfectly competitive markets,’ thus, allowing for the 
possibility of prejudicial and/or statistical discrimination at equilibrium. Credit 
markets deviate from the specifications of a perfectly competitive market in three 
important ways: the prevailing interest rate consistently falls below the 
‘Walrasian’ equilibrium interest rate; lack of simultaneous exchanges; and, 
asymmetric information.  And, these deviations from the specifications of a 
perfectly competitive market give rise to credit rationing in credit markets, 
allowing for the possibility of prejudicial and/or statistical discrimination at 
equilibrium. 
 
In our study, we test for the existence of prejudicial discrimination in the provision 
of trade credit.  Our methodology is discussed more fully in the “Research 
Methodology and Result” chapter which begins on page 51. 
 
In the next section, a synopsis of major empirical research is presented. 
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Table 1.  Major Theoretical Research on Discrimination in Mortgage Lending 
A Summary of Major Theoretical Research on Discrimination in Mortgage Lending8 by Proponents of the Information-Cost 
School 
Theorist(s) 
[discrimination 
type modeled] 
 
 
Major Assumptions 
 
 
Major Findings 
Stiglitz & Weiss  
[Statistical 
discrimination] 
(Stiglitz and 
Weiss 1981) 
1) The market is characterized by asymmetric information.   
2) Lender has no 'taste' for discrimination.   
3) The market contains an array of projects with varying 
risks and expected rates of return.   
4) All projects associated with a group have the same 
expected rate of return; however, the risk may vary (and 
can be quantified).   
5) Given adverse selection and moral hazard, lenders have 
a "bank optimal" interest rate (r*) at which they maximize 
their return.  r* is always below the Walrasian equilibrium 
interest rate. 
6) There are n distinguishable groups 
 
If the risk-adjusted interest rate for Group "X's" projects exceeds the bank 
optimal interest rate, credit rationing may occur such that members of Group 
X will not receive access to credit until another group's credit need are first 
met.  In the most extreme case, a bank may set a 'bank optimal" interest 
rate, which prohibits lending to a particular group because the interest rate 
is set lower than the bank's required return for that particular group.  In 
short, lending to a member of that group is too risky given the "bank optimal" 
interest rate. 
Guttentag and 
Wachter  
[Statistical  
discrimination] 
(Guttentag and 
Wachter 1980) 
1) The market is characterized by asymmetric information.   
2) No Lender has a 'taste' for discrimination.   
3) Lenders fail to coordinate information gathering and 
lending activities.   
 
Two types of redlining are possible: neighborhood effects and social 
discrimination. The failure of lenders to pool resources in gathering 
underwriting information in certain communities may result in neighborhood 
effects redlining.  Rational social discrimination redlining occurs when 
protected borrower characteristics are: (a) correlated with risk and (b) 
employed in the lender's underwriting process.  Establishing social 
discrimination (s.d.) redlining is difficult because s.d. redlining variables are 
closely correlated with neighborhood effects redlining (given the spatial 
segregation of various racial and ethnic populations). 
                                            
8 The format and contents of this table benefits significantly from a table included in an excellent article by Reynold Nesiba Nesiba, R. F. (1996). 
“Racial Discrimination in Residential Lending Markets: Why Empirical Researchers always see it and Economic Theorists never do.” Journal of 
Economic Issues XXX(1): pp. 51 - 77..   The Prejudicial and Statistical discrimination are synonymous with Non-economic and Economic 
discrimination, respectively.  
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Lang and 
Nakamura  
[Statistical 
discrimination] 
(Lang and 
Nakamura 1993) 
1) The market is characterized by asymmetric information.   
2) No Lender has a 'taste' for discrimination, however, in 
the past, there was prejudicial discrimination. 
3) Home appraisals are imperfect estimates of true value.   
4) The accuracy of a lender’s underwriting in a given area 
is positively correlated with the number of real estate 
transactions previously completed in that neighborhood, 
ceteris paribus. 
As the number of home sales in a given neighborhood increases, 
the accuracy of appraisals improve and lenders are better able to 
assess risk, ceteris paribus.  If lenders have historically done little 
lending in a neighborhood of color and few transactions have 
occurred, appraisals for that neighborhood will be less accurate 
compared with those for other neighborhoods.  Thus, lenders will 
perceive more risk, and seek higher down payments which will 
discourage transactions in that area 

  - 23 - 
 
3.2. Empirical Research on Discrimination in Credit Markets 
 
While there has been much empirical research on discrimination in home 
mortgage markets and a growing body of empirical research on discrimination in 
bank loans to small businesses, this author has found no empirical research that 
tests for discrimination in provision of trade credit.  And, only two empirical 
studies were found that address (even tangentially) the primary research 
questions that motivate our study (Coleman 2003; Aaronson, Bostic et al. 2004).  
Given the preceding, in this section, we will briefly outline some major findings for 
discrimination in home mortgage lending and some major findings for 
discrimination in business lending.   Then we will discuss in more detail the 
findings of Aaronson et. al. and Coleman et. al. 
 
Before reviewing and discussing the various empirical studies, one area of 
controversy demands our attention.  This area of contention is how best to detect 
discrimination, if it exists.  In other words, what method of analysis is appropriate.  
The majority of the empirical studies can be grouped into three broad categories: 
(1) various types of Rejection Rate Analyses9, (2) Fair Share Analyses, and (3) 
Loan Performance Analyses. 
 
3.2.1. Principal Research Methods Employed 
 
One of the three broad categories of analysis is Rejection Rate Analyses.  
Essentially, all of the methods that fall into this category quantify and compare 
the likelihood of rejection or approval of a credit request by a member of a 
minority group versus a non-minority group.   Underlying this approach is the 
assumption that a higher rejection rate (however calculated) for minorities versus 
non-minorities implies the existence of discrimination (Nesiba 1996, pg. 56).  
 
The specific methods of analysis that fall into this category vary in sophistication. 
 
The simplest form of Rejection Rate Analysis entails the calculation of a “simple 
rejection rate” for minority credit applicants and the comparison of the minority 
simple rejection rate to that for non-minority credit applicants (Ross and Yinger 
2002, pp. 94-106).  The simple rejection rate for minority credit applicants would 
be calculated as follows: (1) Determine the total number of credit requests 
submitted to an institution from minority group members during some period of 
time. (2) Determine how many of those requests were denied.  (3) Divide the 
number obtained in Step #2 by the number obtained in Step #1 to determine the 
simple rejection rate for minority credit applicants.  By following an analogous 
process, the simple rejection rate for non-minority applicants can be determined.  
With both the minority and non-minority simple rejection rates in hand, they can 
be compared.  If simple rejection rate for minorities exceeds that observed for 
                                            
9 Approval rates analyses and Rejection Rate Analyses are essentially one and the same: one is 
the mirror image of the other. 
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non-minorities then discrimination is a possible explanation of the observed 
disparity.  That said, any observed disparities may reflect other factors (e.g. 
differences in average income levels, wealth, employment stability, etc.). 
 
The apparent limitations of simple Rejection Rate Analysis led empirical 
researchers to develop more sophisticated methods that allow a researcher to 
account for (control) some of the other factors that may account for observed 
disparities in simple rejection rates across racial/ethnic groups. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum of sophistication are those studies that employ 
binomial logit (and/or probit) regression models.  Typically, the dependent 
variable in these studies is the probability10 of a credit request being denied.  In 
the most straightforward applications of binomial logit models, the independent 
variables typically include various measures of creditworthiness and 
demographic descriptors including race.  If a race variable coded to identify 
minority applicants proves statistically significant, it suggests that discrimination 
is a possibility.   
 
Another common application of the binomial logit models entails estimating 
separate regression models and denial rates for non-minority and minority credit 
applicants.  This allows a researcher to quantify the influence of the differences 
in credit applicants’ endowments on differences in denial rates for minority and 
non-minority group members (Cavalluzzo 2002, pg. 15).  The term ‘endowments’ 
refers to various creditworthiness-related characteristics of a credit applicant (e.g. 
credit history, net worth, etc.)  Ultimately, this procedure allows the researcher to 
decompose the differences in denial rates between minority and non-minority 
applicants into two components, one component due to differences in 
endowments between minority and non-minority applicants, and, a second 
component due to differences in the treatment of applicants given those 
endowments (Cavalluzzo 2002, pg. 15).    
 
The procedure requires that the sample of credit applicants be divided (at 
minimum) into two sub-samples: a minority sub-sample and a non-minority sub-
sample.   Then a separate regression model and denial rate is calculated for non-
minority and minority credit applicants, respectively. Frequently, the denial rate 
for the sub-sample of minority credit applicants is higher than that estimated for 
the non-minority sub-sample.  Then the mean values of the independent 
variables for the minority credit applicants sub-sample are plugged into the non-
minority regression model to determine the denial rate for minority credit 
applicants in a world that is ‘color-blind.’  The resulting ‘color-blind’’ denial rate 
for the minority credit applicants sub-sample typically is lower than the original 
denial rate for the sub-sample of minority credit applicants but higher than the 
non-minority denial rate, reflecting differences in the average level of 
                                            
10 Specifically, the dependent variable in a binomial logit regression model is the log of the odds 
that a credit request will be denied Studenmund, A. H. (2001). Using Econometrics: a practical 
guide. New York, Addison Wesley Longman, Inc.. 
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creditworthiness of minorities versus non-minorities (the ‘endowment effect’).   
The results of this procedure are best illustrated by looking at an actual example.  
Table 2 is based on a table included in a 2002 study by Calvalluzzo et al. (see 
Table 6 2002, pg. 32). 
 
 
Table 2.  Total Endowment Effect 
Total Endowment Effect 
 
Row 
  
White
African-
American 
 
Hispanic 
 
Asian 
1 Actual Denial Ratesa for sub-
samples 
 
0.241
 
0.618 
 
0.497 
 
0.524 
 
2 
Differences in Denial Ratesa for 
Minorities versus Whites 
 
0.000
 
0.377 
 
0.256 
 
0.283 
3 “Color Blind” Denial Ratesa 0.241 0.367 0.317 0.317 
 
4 
Differences in Denial Ratesa 
 (explained by differences in 
endowments) 
 
n/a 
 
0.126 
 
0.076 
 
0.076 
 
5 
% Differences in Denial Ratesa 
 (explained by differences in 
endowments) 
 
n/a 
 
33.5% 
 
29.7% 
 
27.0%
Notes: 
a) Point estimate for sub-sample means of independent variables. 
b) Source: (Table 6 inCavalluzzo 2002, pg. 32) 
 
In this study, Cavalluzzo et al. divided their sample of credit applicants into four 
sub-samples: White credit applicants; African-American credit applicants; 
Hispanic credit applicants; and, Asian credit applicants.   For each sub-sample a 
separate regression model was calculated.  Then the mean values for each 
independent variable for given sub-sample were plugged into the corresponding 
regression model to determine the mean denial rate for each sub-sample (the 
‘Actual’ denial rates).  The resulting ‘Actual’ denial rates for each racial/ethnic 
group are shown in Row #1.  In Row #2, the numerical difference in the denial 
rate relative to ‘Whites’ is calculated for each minority group.  Row #3 shows the 
denial rates for each minority group if the mean independent variable values for 
each minority sub-sample are plugged into the ‘White’ regression model. (the 
“Color Blind” denial rates)  Row #4 contains the difference between the Color 
Blind denial rate for each minority group and the ‘White’ denial rate.  Finally, 
using the figures in Row # 2 and #4, the portion of the difference between the 
‘White’ denial rate and the ‘Actual’ denial rate for each minority group that can be 
explained by differences in endowment can be calculated.  Row #5 shows, for 
each minority group, the percentage of the difference between the ‘White’ denial 
rate and the ‘Actual’ denial rate for the minority group that can be explained by 
differences in endowments.  For example, the actual denial rate for African-
American is more than two and one-half times higher than the actual denial rates 
for Whites.  Clearly, a portion reflects differences in average levels of 
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endowments between African-Americans and Whites.  Cavalluzzo et al. estimate 
that these differences in average levels of endowments account for 
approximately one-third of the observed disparity in loan denial rates between 
Whites and African-Americans.  The remaining two-thirds of the disparity in 
denial rates between African-Americans and Whites result from other causes.  
Cavalluzzo et al. argue that primary among those other causes is discrimination. 
 
The analysis by Cavalluzzo et al. discussed in the preceding paragraphs is 
representative of the more sophisticated versions of rejection analyses. 
Essentially, all Rejection Rate Analyses methods quantify and compare the 
likelihood of rejection or approval of a credit request by a member of a minority 
group versus a non-minority group.   Underlying this approach is the assumption 
that a higher rejection rate (however calculated) for minorities versus non-
minorities implies the existence of discrimination (Nesiba 1996, pg. 56). 
 
The second of the three broad categories of analysis is “Fair Share Analyses.”  
Broadly speaking, all of the various methods of Fair Share Analyses quantify and 
compare the distribution of outstanding credit across either racial/ethnic groups 
or geographic space (e.g. census tracts).  The methods of Fair Share Analyses 
range along two dimensions: (a) the extent to which the study tries to control for 
differences in endowments, and (b) the applicable unit of analysis which may 
consist of individuals, firms or census tracts.   
 
Fair Share Analyses range in sophistication.  To illustrate Fair Share Analyses in 
its most elementary form, it would be helpful to look at the home mortgage 
market.  A study might focus on a metropolitan area (MSA), identifying the 
number and proportion of mortgages made in each census tract in that MSA 
controlling for income, the number of mortgageable housing units and 
race/ethnicity.  The number and the proportion of mortgages for various census 
tracts are compared to each other and the average for the MSA (Nesiba 1996, 
pg. 57).    
 
After controlling for income, the number of mortgageable housing units and 
race/ethnicity, if there are a smaller number and/or proportion of mortgages in 
census tracts with high levels of minorities (relative to the average for the MSA) 
then discrimination may be a possible explanation of the observed disparity. 
 
In its most sophisticated form, a Fair Share analysis might look like the 1997 
empirical study by Bates where he presents a regression model to explain the 
loan amounts extended to start-up firms by financial institutions. (Bates 1997)  In 
this study, the dependent variable is “the dollar amount of debt used to start or 
become owner of the business” (see Table 1 in Bates 1997, pg. 489).  The unit of 
analysis is the firm and the sample includes firms owned by Blacks and Whites.  
The regression model includes four types of independent variables: “(1) owner 
equity capital investment, (2) owner human capital traits, (3) loan source, and (4) owner 
demographic traits” (Bates 1997, pg. 489).  Ultimately, Bates found that “Black-
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owned businesses received [significantly] smaller loans than white-owned firms 
with identical measured characteristics” (Bates 1997, pg. 487 and 491). 
 
Underlying this approach are two important assumptions: (a) discrimination may 
exist if, after controlling for differences in endowments across demographic 
groups, the distribution of outstanding credit does not closely mirror the 
distribution of the relevant population across racial/ethnic groups; and (b) the 
demand among various racial/ethnic groups is the same.  If the analysis focuses 
on the spatial distribution of outstanding credit within an MSA, then the preceding 
assumptions would be restated as follows: (a) discrimination may exist if, after 
controlling for three types of independent variables (measures of mean income 
for the appropriate unit of observation (e.g. individuals, firms, families, etc.), the 
number of potential borrowers and demographics measures including race), the 
race variable is statistically significant in explaining the aggregate amount of 
outstanding credit in an area; and, (b) the demand among various areas (e.g. 
census tracts) within an MSA is the same (Nesiba 1996, pp. 57-58). 
 
The third broad categories of analysis is ‘Loan Performance Analyses.’  
Essentially, all of the methods that fall into this category attempt to quantify the 
profitability of loans and/or the incidence and cost of defaults for minority and 
non-minority borrowers (Ross and Yinger 2002, pp. 235-239).  Underlying this 
approach is the assumption that either a higher average level of profitability or a 
lower average frequency of default for minority borrowers compared with non-
minority borrower is symptomatic of taste-based discrimination. 
 
“The commonly held view has been that if there exists taste-based 
discrimination, loans approved to minority borrowers would have higher 
expected profitability than to majorities with comparable credit 
background. . . . We also show that there must exist taste-based 
discrimination if loans to minority borrowers have higher expected rate[s] 
of return or lower expected rate[s] of default loss than to majorities with 
the same exogenous characteristics observed at the time of loan 
origination” (see the abstract of Han 2001). 
 
Loan Performance Analyses vary in sophistication.  To illustrate Loan 
Performance Analyses in its most elementary form, it would be helpful to look at 
the home mortgage market.  Loan Performance Analyses might entail the 
estimation of the interest rate paid on an outstanding mortgage after controlling 
for difference in endowments, etc.  The sample for such a study would include 
data for both minority and non-minority borrowers covering at least six classes of 
independent variables: (1) measures of creditworthiness, (2) neighborhood 
descriptors, (3) collateral descriptors (single-family, two-family dwelling, etc.), (4) non-
interest credit terms, (5) prevailing interest rates at the time of origination, and (6) a 
borrower’s demographic traits. 
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Underlying this approach is the assumption that a higher average interest rate 
(after controlling for creditworthiness, etc.) for minorities versus non-minorities 
implies the existence of discrimination. 
 
More complex versions of Loan Performance Analyses employ multivariate 
analysis that includes multiple dependent variables (e.g. measures of profitability, 
and rates and cost of default - For an example, see Han 2001). 
 
To summarize, the majority of the empirical studies can be grouped into three 
broad categories: (1) Rejection Rate Analyses11, (2) Fair Share Analyses, and (3) 
Loan Performance Analyses. 
 
Having outlined this catalogue of methodological approaches, we can describe 
and discuss several of the significant empirical studies. 
 
The increased availability of appropriate datasets has increased both the fervor 
and the ranks of scholars engaged in the debate between empirical researchers 
and theoreticians.  Given the central role of data in fueling this debate, it will 
prove helpful to organize the review of empirical studies by major datasets. 
 
 
3.2.2. Availability of Empirical Data 
 
Prior to 1987, the work of theoreticians stood largely unvetted by empirical data.  
In 1987, the first of several major datasets that would allow researchers to test 
for discrimination in credit markets became widely available: the 1982 
Characteristics of Business Owners (the “CBO”) survey.  By 1989, the results 
of several empirical studies employing the 1982 CBO dataset had been 
published. It was the publication in 1989 of these empirical studies that ignited 
the debate regarding the existence or non-existence of discrimination in credit 
markets that continues to this day. The following table identifies five major 
datasets and indicates the year during which each became widely available. 
                                            
11 Approval rates analyses and Rejection Rate Analyses are essentially one and the same: one is 
the mirror image of the other. 
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Table 3.  Availability of Major Empirical Datasets for the study of Discrimination 
Availability of Major Empirical Datasets for the Study of Discrimination in 
various Credit Markets 
 The Year the Dataset became widely available 
Credit Market 1987 1991 1997 2001 
Home Mortgage  HMDA   
Small business loans CBO NSSBF CRA SSBF 
Notes: 
CBO (Characteristics of Business Owners) datasets were generated for the years 
1982, 1987 and 1992 by the U.S. Census Bureau (Yazdipour 1991, pg. 173). 
CRA (Community Reinvestment Act):  Under the modified CRA provisions adopted in 
1995, banks with assets totaling more than $250 million or affiliated with a holding 
company with more than $1 billion in total assets are required to report small business 
and small farm loans to their primary regulatory agency.  Datasets are generated 
annually (Squires and O'Connor 1999. pp. 85-88).   
HMDA (Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975):  Pursuant to the 1989 amendments 
to HMDA per certain provisions of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA), all mortgage lenders located in urban areas with assets 
totaling at least $10 million in total assets are required to track and report data about 
mortgage loans applications received and mortgage loans provided, including the 
location of each property associated with an application, the ultimate disposition of an 
application and loan denial rates broken down by race/ethnicity, as well as location.   
HMDA data captures more than 80 percent of the residential mortgage lending in the 
country (Ross and Yinger 2002, pp. 3-4).  Datasets are generated annually. 
NSSBF (National Survey of Small Business Finances) was co-sponsored by the 
Board of Governor of the Federal Reserve and the Small Business Administration.  
There are datasets for the years 1987 and 1993 (Yazdipour 1991, pg. 172). 
SSBF (Survey of Small Business Finances): Prior to 1998, this survey was known as, 
the NSSBF. While the name has changed, the survey instrument and methodology 
remains largely unchanged (Bitler, Robb et al. 2001).  Datasets are generated on a 
five-year cycle.  Currently, the 1998, 1993 and 1987 datasets are publicly available. 
 
As Table 3 illustrates, all but one of these major datasets focus on business 
lending.  Only the HMDA dataset examines the home mortgage market.  We will 
look at one major study that employs HMDA data and then identify and discuss 
various studies that have used the datasets that focus on small business lending.  
Specifically, studies employing CBO datasets will be discussed second; research 
employing CRA datasets will be discussed third; and studies employing SSBF 
datasets will be discussed last. 
 
3.2.3. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA) Data 
 
In the late 1960s, concerns about redlining and discrimination against 
communities of color by mortgage lenders gave rise to grassroots groups in 
urban communities across the country that advocated for increased access to 
mortgage credit for low-income communities and communities of color (Williams 
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and Nesiba 1997, pp. 74-75).  Among other things, these grassroots community 
groups pushed for the passage of two acts of legislation that became law in the 
1970s: the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977; and, the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act of 1975. 
 
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) as amended over the intervening years 
has been instrumental in providing researchers with empirical data about small 
business and consumer lending activity around the country.  However, in the 
case of both the CRA and HMDA, the amendments that would transform these 
laws into effective regulatory tools came more than a decade after the initial 
legislation.  The CRA data is discussed at more length later in this section of the 
paper. 
 
Pursuant to the 1989 amendments to HMDA per certain provisions of the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) and 
various other amendments in 1980, 1988, 1999 and 2000, most mortgage 
lenders located in urban areas are required to track and report data about 
mortgage loans applications received (FFIEC n.d.).    
 
HMDA captures information about mortgage lending by a range of financial 
institutions, including banks, savings associations, credit unions, and other 
mortgage lending institutions. All depository institutions with at least $33 million in 
total assets located in urban areas and all non-depository institutions with at least 
$10 million in total assets located in urban areas are required to track and submit 
HMDA data (FFIEC n.d.).  The datasets for the years 1991 through 2004 are 
largely comparable and contain the range of information including the location of 
each property associated with an application, the income of applicants, the 
ultimate disposition of an application, the amount of the mortgage provided (if an 
application is approved) and loan denial rates broken down by race/ethnicity, 
gender and location (FFIEC n.d.). 
 
HMDA data captures more than 80 percent of the residential mortgage lending in 
the country (Ross and Yinger 2002, pp. 3-4).  Datasets are generated annually.  
The latest publicly available dataset contains information for the year 2004. 
 
One of the most widely-cited studies employing HMDA data is the so called 
‘Boston Fed Study’ (Munnell, Tootell et al. 1996).  Munnell et al. estimate a 
regression model for the probability of being denied a mortgage (the loan denial 
rate), minimizing omitted-variable bias, to determine the principal source(s) of the 
significant disparities in loan denial rates for various ethnic groups as reported by 
the HMDA data.  The study’s research methodology falls into the “Rejection Rate 
Analyses” category. 
 
Ultimately, Munnell et al. (1996) concluded that Black and Hispanic applicants 
were about 80 percent more likely to be turned down than were white applicants 
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who had comparable property and personal characteristics (Munnell, Tootell et 
al. 1996, pg. 26). 
 
The strength of this study is that it minimizes the likelihood of omitted variable 
bias.  No fundamental flaws have ever been identified in the Boston Fed Study.  
And, for that reason, the Boston Fed Study invariably is mentioned in discussions 
about discrimination in mortgage markets (Ross and Yinger 2002).  
 
 
3.2.4. The Characteristics of Business Owners Survey12 (CBO) 
 
Prior to 1997, most of the empirical research on discrimination in business 
lending employed data from the Characteristics of Business Owners Survey 
(CBO) (Bates 1989; Bates 1993,a; Bates 1993,b; Bates 1997; Bates 1997; Robb 
2000).  The U.S. Census Bureau generated CBO datasets for the years 1882, 
1987 and 1992.  
 
The CBO survey drew its samples from those individuals and firms captured by 
the Survey of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises (the “SMOBE”) which was 
also administered by the U.S. Census Bureau.  From 1977 through 1997, 
SMOBE datasets were generated every five years (Bates 1993, pg. 38).   The 
latest publicly available SMOBE13 dataset contains information for the year 1997.   
 
The latest publicly available CBO dataset contains information for the year 1992.  
(U.S. Bureau of the Census )  In total each CBO dataset contains data on more 
than 116,000 individuals divided into five panels.  Each of the five panels 
contains data more than 20,000 persons who were self-employed during the 
study year [U. S. Census Bureau, 1997 #290, pg. 7].  
 
“The five panels are as follows: Panel One, Hispanic; Panel Two, other 
minority (largely Asian); Panel Three, Black; Panel Four, female (minority 
as well as non-minority); Panel Five, white male” (Bates 1993, pg. 116). 
 
The datasets include more than thirty variables that attempt to capture both 
quantitative and qualitative information about either the firm or its owner: owner’s 
demographics (e.g. age, sex, marital status, etc.); owner’s human capital (e.g. 
years of schooling); firms’ labor force (e.g. size, gender mix, etc.); and, business 
characteristics (e.g. the firms four-digit SIC code, its legal form of organization, 
etc.) 
                                            
12 In February 2005, the U.S. Census Bureau made available the “Advance Report on 
Characteristics of Employers Business Owners: 2002.”  The Characteristics of Employer 
Business Owners provides information about firms and their owners for year 2002 and in effect 
replaces the CBO.  The CBO data for 1997 was never made publicly available. 
13 In July 2005, the U.S. Census Bureau made available the 2002 Survey of Business Owners 
(SBO).  The SBO in effect replaces the SMOBE and SWOBE, Survey of Women-Owned 
Business Enterprises U.S. Census Bureau (2005). 2002 Survey of Business Owners. Washington 
(D.C.), U.S. Census Bureau. 2006.. 
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Bates (1997) published the results of a study that is representative of those 
employing CBO datasets. 
 
One of the primary motivations for this study is to determine if and how the size 
of a commercial loan obtained by a start-up businesses varies by owner’s race 
and/or ethnicity (Bates 1997, pp. 487-488).  Put more simply, the Bates study 
attempts to determine if the CBO data provides any evidence of discrimination in 
the small business lending.  To address this question, Bates presents a 
regression model for explaining the size (amount) of a loan made to a small 
business14 at start-up after controlling for following types of factors: owner’s 
human capital; owner’s equity investment in the start-up; loan source; owner’s 
demographic traits; and firm characteristics (Bates 1997, pp. 488-489).  The 
principal research methodology employed by the Bates study falls into the Fair 
Share Analyses15 category.   
 
The Bates study generated two findings that are relevant to our study: 
 
? Black-owned firms receive smaller loans at start-up than non-minority-
owned firms, after controlling for the following factors: owner’s human 
capital; owner’s equity investment in the start-up; loan source; and firm 
characteristics (Bates 1997, pp. 488-489). 
 
? Returns to management experience differ for African-Americans relative to 
non-minorities. All other things being equal, average loan size increases 
as management experience increases for both blacks and non-minorities. 
While greater management experience does translate into increased loan 
amounts for blacks and non-minorities, compared with blacks, non-
minority borrowers receive approximately 35%16 more in incremental loan 
dollars for each year of additional management experience. 
 
                                            
14 Bates defines small business as any firm in the CBO database with annual total sales greater 
than $4,999 Bates, T. (1997). “Unequal access: financial institution lending to Black- and White-
owned small business start-ups.” Journal of Urban Affairs 19(4): 487-495..  Bates’ definition, in 
operation, is more restrictive than the standard used by the U.S. Small Business Administration 
because CBO datasets only capture information for individuals that file tax returns for their 
interest in businesses organized as sole proprietorships, partnerships or subchapter “S” business 
corporations.  By comparison, the U. S. Small Business Administration defines a firm as a small 
business if it employs less than 500 workers without regard to how the business is legally 
organized.  So, the SBA’s definition of a small business includes firms organized as “C” 
corporations as well as those captured in the CBO datasets. 
15 For a detailed description of Fair Share Analyses – see pp. 26-27 of this publication. 
16 This author’s calculation based on the values for the dependent variable when the mean values 
of the independent variables are inserted in the regression model that Bates developed Bates, T. 
(1997). “Unequal access: financial institution lending to Black- and White-owned small business 
start-ups.” Journal of Urban Affairs 19(4): 487-495.. 
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This study has two strengths: (a) it employs large samples of both African-
American and non-minority borrowers: and (b) it uses an extensive set of 
independent variables to explore the sources of disparities between minority and 
non-minority business owners in accessing commercial bank loans at start-up; 
thereby, reducing the likelihood of omitted variable bias. 
 
A limitation of the Bates study involves sample selection.  The samples analyzed 
in the Bates study only include African-American- and non-minority-owned firms 
that had successfully borrowed from a financial institution.  The sample excludes 
firms that have been unsuccessful in obtaining loans and potentially 
underestimating the full impact of discrimination.  So, the findings of the Bates 
study must be viewed in that light. 
 
While new studies employing CBO datasets continue to appear, much of the 
recent research on discrimination in business lending employs data from two 
relatively new sources: the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF)17 and, the 
small business lending data mandated by the Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA).  In the next section, we turn our attention to the CRA.  First, we describe 
the CRA datasets.  Then, we identify and discuss two major studies the employ 
CRA datasets. 
  
 
3.2.5. Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Data 
 
CRA, formally Title VIII of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, 
explicitly states that financial institutions have a duty to help meet the credit 
needs of the local communities in which they are operation . . . consistent with 
safe and sound operations of such institutions  (Williams and Nesiba 1997, pg. 
75).  This legislation as amended over the intervening years has been 
instrumental in providing researchers with empirical data about small business 
and consumer lending activity around the country. 
 
Under the modified CRA provisions adopted in 1995, banks with assets totaling 
more than $250 million or affiliated with a holding company with more than $1 
billion in total assets are required to report small business and small farm loans 
to their primary regulatory agency (e.g. Comptroller of the Currency, Federal 
Reserve, etc.) commencing in 1996 (Squires and O'Connor 2001, pg. 3). 
 
Since 1995, several empirical studies have examined small business lending, a 
direct outgrowth of changes in the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”).     
Among other things, this newly available source of data has allowed researchers 
to test for the existence of discrimination in small business lending.  This new 
stream of data is important because access to credit (both bank and trade credit) 
                                            
17 In 1998, this survey was renamed the “Survey of Small Business Finances.”  Prior to 1998, 
this survey was known as, the National Survey of Small Business Finances. While the name 
has changed the survey instrument and methodology remains largely unchanged. 
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is a major determinant of the rate of formation and of survival of small 
businesses. 
 
Below we identify and discuss two studies that are representative of those using 
CRA datasets: Immergluck(1999) and Squires and O’Connor (2001). 
 
The Immergluck study analysis CRA data for any evidence of either redlining or 
discrimination in the small business lending in Metro Chicago.  Immergluck 
estimates a regression model for determining the number of loans made to small 
businesses18 in a given neighborhood per year, after controlling for firm density, 
firm size and industrial mix (Immergluck 1999, pg. 128).  Specifically, this study 
explores if and how the number of commercial loans obtained by small 
businesses in the six-county Chicago area varies by either the income-level or 
the racial/ethnic composition of the neighborhood where the firm is located 
(Immergluck 1999, pp. 123-125). 
 
Strictly speaking, ‘redlining’ refers to the practice by mortgage lenders of 
identifying an area within which they would not extend credit.  In the past, some 
mortgage lenders would trace on a map the boundaries of an area within which 
they would not lend with a red crayon or pen, giving rise to the term ‘redlining’ 
(Guttentag and Wachter 1980, pg. 11).  In general parlance, redlining refers to 
the practice by a financial institution of constraining the quantity of credit 
extended to borrowers located in a given neighborhood based on considerations 
other than objective measures of creditworthiness. 
 
The principal research methodology employed by the Immergluck study falls into 
the “Fair Share Analyses” category.  (For a detailed description of Fair Share 
Analyses – see pp. 26-27 of this publication.)  Specifically, Immergluck engaged 
in somewhat sophisticated forms of Fair Share Analyses that employed either 
ordinary least squares (OLS) or weighted least squares (WLS) estimations 
(Immergluck 1999, pp. 128-131). 
 
Using OLS estimations, Immergluck concluded the following: 
 
? All other variables held constant, going from an all White to an equivalent 
all Black neighborhood is accompanied by an 18% decrease in the 
number of loans made in a census tract.  
 
                                            
18 Immergluck’s definition of small business is a firm with annual total sales of less than 
$1,000,000. Immergluck, D. (1999). Intraurban patterns of small business lending: findings from 
the new Community Reinvestment Act data. Business Access to Capital and Credit: A Federal 
Reserve System Research Conference, Arlington, VA, Federal Reserve System.  Immergluck’s 
definition, in operation, is more restrictive than the standard used by the U.S. Small Business 
Administration.  The U. S. Small Business Administration defines a firm as a small business if it 
employs less than 500 workers.   
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? All other variables held constant, going from an all White to an equivalent 
all Hispanic neighborhood is accompanied by a 39% decrease in the 
number of loans made in a census tract.  
 
In addition to the OLS estimates, Immergluck also used WLS estimators to 
remedy any bias that might result from spatial autocorrelation. 
 
“. . . the problem of spatial autocorrelation . . . occurs when the regression 
residuals of a pair of nearby observations are more similar than those of 
more distant pairs and can result in biased coefficient estimates. 
 
. . . [spatial autocorrelation is a direct consequence of] the fact that bank 
branches, which tend to be located in middle- and upper-income areas, 
[typically] serve [several] census tracts.  Thus, the demographics of 
surrounding areas may be an important determinant of a neighborhood’s 
lending level” (Immergluck 1999, pp. 129-130). 
 
To address the problem of spatial autocorrelation, Immergluck estimated two 
spatial lag models.  Specifically, these models “account for the lending levels for 
other [census tracts] within a distance of approximately 7 miles and weights 
these neighboring observations by an inverse distance function” (Immergluck 
1999, pg. 129).  In the first model, the spatial lag variable is equal to the inverse 
distance squared; and, in the second model, the spatial lag variable is equal to 
the inverse distance cubed.   
 
Correcting spatial autocorrelation with the addition of a spatial lag variable equal 
to the inverse distance squared, Immergluck again found statistically significant 
differences between comparable Hispanic and White neighborhoods; however, 
the differences for comparable Black and White neighborhoods were not 
statistically significant.   
 
With the spatial lag variable equaling the inverse distance cubed, the differences 
for both comparable Hispanic and White neighborhoods and comparable Black 
and White neighborhoods were statistically significant (see Table III on pg. 135 in 
Immergluck 1999, pg. 130). 
 
In sum, one can conclude from the Immergluck study that Hispanic 
neighborhoods experience lower lending rates than non-minority neighborhoods, 
after controlling for firm size, industrial mix and firm density.  The findings for 
Black neighborhoods are not as conclusive as those for Hispanic neighborhoods. 
 
The strength of the Immergluck study is that it provides a macro-view of the flow 
of small business loans across a major metropolitan area.  That said, both the 
study’s author admits and the critics of the study assert that the lack of a 
variable(s) to account for the creditworthiness of firms within a given census tract 
severely limits the study’s ability to determine the cause of the observed 
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disparities in lending volumes between minority and non-minority neighborhoods 
(Yezer 1999).  
 
Now, we turn our attention to a study by Squires and O’Connor, published in 
2001.  Compared with the Immergluck study, the Squires and O’Connor study is 
much less sophisticated.  The Squires and O’Connor study explores if and how 
the number of commercial loans obtained by small businesses varies by either 
the income-level and/or the racial/ethnic composition of a firm’s neighborhood 
(Squires and O'Connor 2001, pp. 2-3).  Put more simply, the Squires and 
O’Connor study attempts to determine if the CRA data provides any evidence of 
either redlining19 or discrimination in the small business lending in Metro 
Milwaukee. 
 
The Squires and O’Connor “study examines small business loans20 [for the years 
1996 and 1999] in the four-county Milwaukee metropolitan statistical area (MSA).  
The four counties are Milwaukee, Ozaukee, Washington, and Waukesha” 
(Squires and O'Connor 2001, pp. 3-4).  Banks and thrifts made 15,181 loans 
during 1996 to firms located in the Milwaukee MSA.  In 1999, banks and thrifts 
made 17,356 loans in Metro Milwaukee (see Table 1 in Squires and O'Connor 
2001, pp. 6-7). 
 
The principal research methodology employed by the Squires and O’Connor 
study falls into the “Fair Share Analyses” category.  (For a detailed description of 
Fair Share Analyses – see pp. 26-27 of this publication.)  Specifically, Squires 
and O’Connor engaged in a very elementary form of Fair Share Analyses that 
calculate the actual lending volumes by either the income-level or the racial 
composition of a neighborhood (Squires and O'Connor 2001, pp. 3-21).   
 
Squires and O’Connor study includes one finding that bears upon our proposed 
research which is an observation about the distribution of small business lending 
volume by neighborhood racial/ethnic composition.  Relative to the population 
density, small business lending in Milwaukee was disproportionately 
concentrated in non-minority neighborhoods in 1996 and in 1999. 
                                            
19 Strictly speaking, ‘redlining’ refers to the practice by mortgage lenders of identifying an area 
within which they would not extend credit.  In the past, some mortgage lenders would trace on a 
map the boundaries of an area within which they would not lend with a red crayon or pen, giving 
rise to the term ‘redlining’ Guttentag, J. M. and S. M. Wachter (1980). Redlining and Public Policy. 
New York, New York University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Salomon Brothers 
Center for the Study of Financial Institutions: pp. 53..  In general parlance, redlining refers to the 
practice by a financial institution of constraining the quantity of credit extended to borrowers 
located in a given neighborhood based on considerations other than objective measures of 
creditworthiness. 
20 Squires and O’Connor define small business loans as those whose original amounts are $1 
million or less and which are secured by nonfarm or nonresidential real estate.  In practice, the 
Squires and O’Connor definition is more restrictive than that of the U.S. Small Business 
Administration and only captures those loans that meet the definition of “loans to small 
businesses” that are reported in ‘Call Reports’ Squires, G. D. and S. O'Connor (2001). Access to 
capital: Millwaukee's continuing small business lending gaps, Woodstock Institute. 2004: 26..  
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While the descriptive statistics presented in the Squires and O’Connor study 
make clear that small business lending volumes are lower in minority 
neighborhoods compared with non-minority neighborhoods, the findings do not 
explain why these disparities exist.  This is the fundamental weakness of this 
study.  The observed differences could be a function of several factors including: 
redlining, discrimination, variations in the average level of creditworthiness of the 
firms located in various neighborhoods and/or variations in mix of types of firms 
across neighborhoods.  The Squires and O’Connor study sheds no light on this 
question. 
 
As was stated earlier, much of the recent research on discrimination in business 
lending employs data from two relatively new sources: the small business lending 
data mandated by the CRA and the Survey of Small Business Finances 
(SSBF).21  Having completed our discussion of research using CRA data, we turn 
our attention the SSBF in the next section.  This data is of particular interest 
because we will use both the 1993 and the 1998 SSBF datasets to conduct our 
study. 
 
First, we will describe the SSBF datasets.  Then, we identify and briefly discuss 
five studies that employ SSBF datasets. 
                                            
21 In 1998, this survey was renamed the “Survey of Small Business Finances.”  Prior to 1998, 
this survey was known as, the National Survey of Small Business Finances. While the name 
has changed the survey instrument and methodology remains largely unchanged. 
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3.2.6. Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) Data 
 
SSBF datasets are generated approximately every five years.  The first SSBF 
dataset contains information for the year 1987.  The latest available dataset 
covers the year 1998.  To date, the SSBF has been co-sponsored by the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve (the “Federal Reserve”) and the U. S. Small 
Business Administration.  Each dataset includes data collected from more than 
3,000 firms that were selected to provide a representative sample of the 
population of small businesses in the U.S.  The firms included in the datasets 
were selected from the population of all for-profit, non-financial, non-farm, 
business enterprises with fewer than 500 employees that were listed in Dun’s 
Market Identifier file22 during the relevant study year (Cole and Wolken 1995, pg. 
640). 
                                            
22 The Dun’s Market Identifier file, compiled and maintained by Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., contains 
more than ten million business enterprises and is broadly representative of all business Cole, R. 
A. and J. D. Wolken (1995). “Financial services used by small businesses: evidence from the 
1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances.” Federal Reserve Bulletin(July 1995): 629-
667.. 
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Table 4.  Description of available SSBF Datasets 
Description of Available SSBF Datasets: racial/ethnic breakdown of firm owners 
 Survey Year/Dataset Title 1987/NSSBF 
(i) 
1993/NSSBF 
(ii) 
1998/SSBF 
(iii) 
 Total # of Observations (a) 3,103 5,276 3,550
Non-Hispanic White (b) 2,968
 
4,045 2,790
 
Hispanic White (b) 
 
N/A (b)
 
326 243
Hispanic Other (c) N/A (b) 43 17
Hispanic, Total (b)  41(d)
 
369 260
Black (c) 45 (d) 523 273
Asian & Pacific Islander (c) 49 (d) 336 214Et
hn
ic
ity
 o
f O
w
ne
rs
 
American Indian & Native 
Alaskans (c) (d)
45 24
 Year the dataset became 
publicly available 1991 (e)
 
1997 (f) 
 
2001
Sources: 
i) (Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo 1998, pp. 775-776) 
ii) (See Table 1 in Cole and Wolken 1995, pg. 632) 
iii) (Derived from Table 2 in Bitler, Robb et al. 2001, pg. 186) 
Notes: 
(a) The sum of the various racial/ethnic categories of owners does not equal the “Total” because the 
observations reflected in the row labeled “Hispanic Other” are also included in the amounts 
shown for “Black, Asian & Pacific Islander or American Indian & Native Alaskan.”  
(b) Commencing with the 1990 Census, the U.S. Census Bureau considers ‘Hispanic’ to be an ethnic 
classification not a racial classification.  As a result, there are White Hispanics, Black Hispanics, 
Asian Hispanics, etc.  However, for the purposes of most government activities and agencies (e.g. 
the Small Business Administration), all Hispanics are considered minorities.  Prior to the 1990 
Census, “Hispanic” was treated as a racial category. 
(c) The observations reflected in the row labeled “Hispanic Other” are also included in the amounts 
shown for “Black, Asian & Pacific Islander or American Indian & Native Alaskan.” 
(d) These figures represent only male-owned firms.  Based on comments regarding the dataset by 
Cavalluzzo, the author concludes that in the aggregate there are less than ninety minority female-
owned businesses in the dataset.  Again, based on comments by Cavaluzzo, there are less than 
thirty firms owned by American Indian and Native Alaskans in the dataset (Cavalluzzo and 
Cavalluzzo 1998). 
(e) (See “Available Financial Data Bases for Research on Small Business” in Yazdipour 1991, pg. 
172). 
(f) Author’s determination based on note in a Federal Reserve Bulletin: (See Note 3 in Cole and 
Wolken 1996, pg. 984).  The current version of the Public-Use dataset became available in 1999 
and only includes observations for 4,637 firms (U.S. Federal Reserve System 1999, pp. 1-4). 
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Each of the SSBF dataset contains more than 300 hundred variables that 
capture the following types of information for each firm: 
? Demographic Information on the owner(s) 
? Firm Characteristics (e.g. industry, firm age, location, etc.) 
? An inventory of the firm’s various deposit and savings accounts 
? An inventory of the firm’s various credit obligations (including credit lines, 
mortgages, vehicle loans, equipment loans, etc.) 
? Characteristics of the firm’s financial services suppliers (e.g. type – bank, 
finance company, etc.) 
? Firm’s recent experience applying for credit (e.g. number of loan 
applications and the disposition of those requests) 
? Firm’s recent experience applying for trade credit 
? Data from the Firm’s income statement and balance sheet for the relevant 
study period; and 
? Information regarding the recent credit history of the firm and its owner(s) 
(U.S. Federal Reserve System 1996; U.S. Federal Reserve System 1999; 
U.S. Federal Reserve System 2002). 
 
In the following pages, we will discuss five studies that employ SSBF datasets.  
Three of the five studies are representative of the major empirical studies that 
have tested for evidence of discrimination in credit markets. (Blanchflower, 
Levine et al. 1998; Bostic and Lampani 1999; Cavalluzzo 2002)  The remaining 
two studies are included because these are the only two empirical studies that 
this author has found that address (even tangentially) the primary research 
question of our study (Coleman 2003; Aaronson, Bostic et al. 2004). 
  
The Blanchflower study explores if and how the size of a commercial loan 
obtained by small businesses varies by the owner’s race and/or ethnicity 
(Blanchflower, Levine et al. 1998, pp. 7-9).  Blanchflower et al. estimate a 
regression model for determining the probability of a commercial bank loan being 
denied23 (the loan denial rate), after controlling for creditworthiness 
(Blanchflower, Levine et al. 1998, pg. 1). 
 
The principal research methodology employed by Blanchflower study falls into 
the “Rejection Rate Analyses” category.  Specifically, Blanchflower et al. 
engaged in a sophisticated form of Rejection Rate Analysis that employs 
binomial probit models (Blanchflower, Levine et al. 1998, pp. 11-12). 
 
The Blanchflower study generated three major findings of interest: 
 
? Blanchflower et al. determined that compared with non-minorities, 
minorities are more likely to have unmet credit needs.   
 
                                            
23 Approval rates analyses and Rejection Rate Analyses are essentially one and the same: one is 
the mirror image of the other. 
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? After controlling for a number of creditworthiness factors, Blanchflower et 
al. found that there was no statistically significant difference between non-
minorities and Hispanics; however, blacks remained much more likely to 
be denied credit than non-minorities.   
 
? They also, found that if loans were granted, Blacks paid a higher interest 
rate compared with non-minority-owned firms.  
 
The strength of this study is that it employs such an extensive set of variables to 
explore the sources of disparities between minority and non-minority business 
owners in accessing commercial bank loans; thus, lowering the likelihood of 
omitted variable bias.  That said, critics of the study assert that the lack of a 
measure of the personal net worth of a firm’s owner(s) could result in 
overestimation of unwarranted disparities between black-owned and non-
minority-owned firms. (Avery 1999)   These critics raise a legitimate issue.  
Assessing the owner’s personal net worth is typically an integral part of the 
underwriting process for small business loans, and in omitting this variable, the 
model used by Blanchflower et al. potentially over-estimates the role of 
discrimination (Cavalluzzo 2002, pg. 3). 
 
Aware of the concerns raised about the Blanchflower study, Cavalluzzo et al. 
(2002) published the result of a study that addressed the perceived weaknesses 
of the Blanchflower study. 
 
Like Blanchflower study, the Cavalluzzo study explores if and how the amount of 
commercial loans obtained by small businesses varies by owner’s race and/or 
ethnicity.   Cavalluzzo et al. estimate a regression model for determining the 
probability of a commercial bank loan being denied24 (the loan denial rate), after 
controlling for creditworthiness (Cavalluzzo 2002, pp. 3-5).  However, unlike the 
Blanchflower study, Cavalluzzo et al. included among their independent variables 
some measures of both the personal net worth and credit history of the firm’s 
owner.   
 
In addition to analyzing the variations in loan denial rates across various 
racial/ethnic groups, the Cavalluzzo study also tested if credit market 
concentration impacts any observed disparities in denial rates across 
racial/ethnic groups (Cavalluzzo 2002, pg. 4).  Essentially, Cavalluzzo et al. 
sought to test the relationship between market concentration and the exercise of 
prejudicial discrimination hypothesized by Becker (1957). 
 
“ The level of bank concentration in the firm’s local area is of particular 
interest because small businesses tend to borrow locally, rather than 
nationally.  It is important therefore to understand more fully the possible 
implications of high levels of concentration in local banking markets for 
                                            
24 Approval rates analyses and Rejection Rate Analyses are essentially one and the same: one is 
the mirror image of the other. 
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[small businesses].  One reason that differences in access to credit 
across demographic groups could widen with lender concentration comes 
from Becker (1957), who showed that exercising prejudicial tastes can cut 
into firm profits.  As such, one would expect highly competitive markets to 
eventually purge discriminatory behavior from the market place.  In less 
competitive markets, however, prejudicial discrimination could be 
sustained in the long run.  By controlling for the level of lender market 
concentration, we can test for ceteris paribus differences in denial rates 
[across racial/ethnic groups] according to the level of competition faced by 
lenders” (Cavalluzzo 2002, pg. 4). 
 
The Cavalluzzo study analyzed observations for 948 firms contained in the 1998 
SSBF dataset.25  Given that one of the primary objectives of the study is the 
analysis of loan denial rates, Cavalluzzo et al. selected only those firms that had 
applied for loans within the same three-year period (Cavalluzzo 2002, pg. 6). 
 
The 1998 SSBF dataset differs from the 1987 and the 1993 datasets in one 
important respect.  In addition to the extensive collection of explanatory variables 
referenced above, the 1998 dataset contains data on the personal net worth of 
the principal owner of each firm. 
 
The principal research methodology employed by Cavalluzzo study falls into the 
“Rejection Rate Analyses” category.  (For a detailed description of Rejection 
Rate Analyses – see pp. 23-26 of this publication.)  Specifically, Cavalluzzo et al. 
engaged in a sophisticated form of Rejection Rate Analysis that employed 
binomial logit models.   
 
The Cavalluzzo study generated three major findings.   
 
? Cavalluzzo et al. observed substantial disparities in loan denial rates 
between non-minority- and minority-owned firms even after controlling for 
the following: (i) the creditworthiness, credit history and characteristics of 
the firm; and (ii) the personal net worth, credit history and demographic 
characteristics of the owner (Cavalluzzo 2002, pp. 11-15). 
 
? Cavalluzzo et al. also found some evidence that lender market 
concentration can explain some of the observed disparities between non-
minority- and African-American-owned firms as Becker26 would predict.  
No evidence was found that lender market concentration significantly 
impacts the observed disparities between non-minority- and Hispanic- and 
                                            
25 In total, the 1998 SSBF dataset contains observations on 3,550. (see Table 6 on pg. 41 for 
more details about the composition of the 1998 dataset) 
26 Becker hypothesize that the distinguishing feature of prejudicial discrimination versus statistical 
discrimination is the willingness to pay something, either directly or in the form of reduced 
income, to indulge one’s taste for discrimination Becker, G. S. (1971). The economics of 
discrimination. Chicago, University of Chicago.. 
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Asian-owned firms (Cavalluzzo 2002, pp. 11-15 and see Table 5 on pg. 
31). 
 
? Cavalluzzo et al. observed that including a measure of “the owner’s 
personal wealth did explain some differences between Hispanic-/Asian-
owned businesses and those owned by whites, but almost none for the 
African-American[-owned firms]” (Cavalluzzo 2002, pg. 21). 
 
The strength of this study is that it employs such an extensive set of variables to 
explore the sources of disparities between minority and non-minority business 
owners in accessing commercial bank loans thus, lowering the likelihood of 
omitted variable bias.  As a result, it is difficult to attribute the observed 
disparities between non-minority- and minority-owned firms to omitted variable 
bias. 
 
That said, the study’s finding regarding impact of lender market concentration on 
the observed disparities between non-minority- and minority-owned firms may be 
open to some question because of the limited number of observations for 
minority-owned firms. 
  
Like the Cavalluzzo study, the Bostic and Lampani study estimates a regression 
model for determining the probability of a commercial bank loan being denied27 
(the loan denial rate), after controlling for creditworthiness (Bostic and Lampani 
1999, pp. 149-151).   This study explores if and how the amount of commercial 
loans obtained by small businesses varies by owner’s race and/or ethnicity.  
However, unlike the Blanchflower study, Bostic and Lampani included among 
their independent variables some measures of a firm’s local geography.  Bostic 
and Lampani included two types of local geography variables: economic 
characteristics of the area where a firm is located and, measures of the racial 
composition of the area where a firm is located (Bostic and Lampani 1999, pg. 
155).  Bostic and Lampani clearly indicate that one of the primary motivations for 
their study is to determine if the inclusion of a measure of a firm’s local 
geography will impact observed disparities between various racial/ethnic groups. 
 
Given their interest in the impact of geography on observed disparities in loan 
denial rates across demographic groups, Bostic and Lampani augmented the 
1993 SSBF dataset with economic and demographic data from the 1990 Census 
and measures of the market structure of various local credit markets obtained 
from call reports28. 
 
                                            
27 Approval rates analyses and Rejection Rate Analyses are essentially one and the same: one is 
the mirror image of the other. 
28 A Call Report is a quarterly report submitted by commercial banks to various federal and state 
banking regulators that details the financial condition and performance of a bank and includes, 
among other things, a breakdown of outstanding loans (segmented by type – e.g. residential 
mortgage, automobile loans, etc.). 
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The principal research methodology employed by Bostic and Lampani study falls 
into the “Rejection Rate Analyses” category.  (For a detailed description of 
Rejection Rate Analyses – see pp. 23-26 of this publication.)  Specifically, Bostic 
and Lampani engaged in a sophisticated form of Rejection Rate Analysis that 
employs binomial logit models (Bostic and Lampani 1999, pp. 158-161). 
 
The four major findings of the Bostic and Lampani study are: 
 
? Compared with non-minority-owned firms, minority-owned firms, on 
average, “have fewer assets, worse credit history, and other features that 
make them appear more risky to prospective lenders” (Bostic and 
Lampani 1999, pg. 161). 
 
? After controlling for a number of factors (including “firm, owner, loan and 
banking market characteristics”), Bostic and Lampani found that there was 
no statistically significant difference in loan denial rates between non-
minorities and Asians and Hispanics (Bostic and Lampani 1999, pg. 161). 
 
? However, after controlling for a number of factors (including “firm, owner, 
loan and banking market characteristics”), Bostic and Lampani found that 
blacks remained much more likely to be denied credit than non-minorities 
(Bostic and Lampani 1999, pg. 161). 
 
? Finally, the study’s results show that “considerations of the local 
geography are important in measuring differences in credit market 
experiences across firms.”   Bostic and Lampani estimated that the 
inclusion of various measures of local geography reduced the disparity in 
the Black-White loan approval rate by approximately 20 percent (Bostic 
and Lampani 1999, pg. 161).                                                                                               
 
The virtue of this study is that it identifies and includes a new class of variables 
(local geography) in loan denial rate analysis.  The authors persuasively argue 
that this class of variable may be a source of the observed disparities in 
commercial loan approval rates between minority and non-minority business 
owners thereby, lowering the likelihood of omitted variable bias.  That said, given 
the pervasive residential segregation that characterizes major MSAs throughout 
the United States, variables that identify and/or characterize various geographical 
locales may be highly correlated with race (especially so, when considering 
various differences between blacks and non-minorities) (Massey and Denton 
1993).  So, one might reasonably speculate that much of the apparent 
explanatory power of these local geography measures is ultimately attributable to 
race.  In other words, local geography measures may share most of their 
explanatory power with ‘race’ variables . . . so, it might be redundant to add them 
to a loan approval model. 
 
 
  - 45 - 
3.2.7. Summary of Empirical Research on Discrimination 
 
To summarize this discussion of the empirical research regarding discrimination 
in credit markets, we can say the following:   
 
Empirical research in this area began in earnest in 1987 when appropriate 
datasets became widely available to researchers.  Much of the empirical 
research to date has attempted in one way or another to determine if there is any 
evidence of prejudicial discrimination in various credit markets.  From 1987 to the 
present, a preponderance of the major empirical studies have found significant 
disparities in access to credit between Blacks and non-minorities.  In most 
instances, the researchers who have found these disparities generally have 
suggested that the observed disparities are evidence of prejudicial discrimination.  
In response to those suggestions that prejudicial discrimination is alive and well 
in various credit markets, the critics of those empirical studies generally have 
replied that the observed disparities reflect either omitted variables bias or 
statistical discrimination not prejudicial discrimination. 
 
In the end, this author concludes that it is difficult to dismiss the possibility of 
prejudicial discrimination after a careful review of the major empirical studies. 
 
 
3.2.8. Prior Research on Trade credit and Discrimination 
 
Now, we will discuss the only two empirical studies that we have found that 
address (even tangentially) the primary research questions to be addressed by 
our proposed research (Coleman 2003; Aaronson, Bostic et al. 2004).  Our 
research questions are: 
 
? Is there any disparity in the quantity of trade credit extended to minority-
owned firms compared with non-minority-owned firms? 
? After controlling for creditworthiness, is there any disparity in the quantity 
of trade credit extended to minority-owned firms compared with non-
minority-owned firms? 
? If, in fact, disparities exist after controlling for creditworthiness, have these 
disparities narrowed over time as Becker would predict? 
 
As was true of the preceding three studies, both of these studies employ SSBF 
datasets. 
 
Aaronson et al. explore if participation by small firms in networks that include 
potential suppliers impact a firm’s access to trade credit.   
 
“Our study explores the importance of social relationships, including 
geographic and ethnic ties, for urban, minority small businesses 
accessing [trade credit]” (Aaronson, Bostic et al. 2004, pg 47). 
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To address this question, Aaronson et al., in essence, designed, completed and 
reported the results of two separate empirical studies in one paper (Aaronson, 
Bostic et al. 2004).  Given that the primary study exclusively employed survey 
data collected in two small neighborhoods in Chicago, Aaronson et al. 
recognized that the findings from the primary study might not be representative of 
the general population of small businesses across the country (Aaronson, Bostic 
et al. 2004, pg. 58).  To vet that possibility, Aaronson et al. completed a 
secondary study that employed data from the 1993 SSBF dataset.  It is this 
secondary study that is of interest to us. 
 
Among other things, the secondary study includes estimations of regression 
models for determining either: (i) the number of trade credit supplier that a firm 
has; or (ii) the percentage of purchases made on account (see Table 4 of 
Aaronson, Bostic et al. 2004, pg. 60). 
 
To generate the two regressions referenced in the preceding paragraph, 
Aaronson et al. analyzed observations for 2,986 firms contained in the 1993 
SSBF dataset.29  Given that one of the purposes of the study is the analysis of 
access to and use of trade credit, Aaronson et al. selected only those firms that 
used some trade credit during the survey period.   
 
In total, Aaronson et al. estimated eleven different models with eleven different 
dependent variables, using a variety of estimation techniques.  Only two of the 
eleven regressions directly bear on our research study: models # 3 and # 5.  The 
dependent variables for those two models are identified in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5.  Trade Credit Regression Models estimated by Aaronson et al. 
Trade Credit Regression Models estimated by Aaronson et al. 
Regression 
# 
 
Dependent Variable 
Estimation  
Technique 
Sample 
Size 
3 Ln(number of suppliers on account +1)   (i) WLS                   (ii) 2,986  (i) 
5 Percentage of purchases on account      (i) WLS                   (ii) 2,986  (i) 
Notes:  
(i) Only those with at least $1 of outstanding trade credit were include in this sample. 
(ii) WLS is an abbreviation for the Weighted Least Squares (an estimation method). WLS 
often is employed as a remedy for heteroskedasticity (Studenmund 2001, pp. 362-
365). 
 
Source: (The content presented in this Table was derived from Table # 4 in Aaronson, Bostic 
et al. 2004, pg. 60). 
 
The dependent variable for model #3 is: the natural log of the number of trade 
credit suppliers that a firm has. The dependent variable for model #5 is: the 
                                            
29 In total, the 1993 SSBF dataset contains observations for approximately 5,300 firms. (see 
Table 6 on pg. 41 for more details about the composition of the 1993 dataset) 
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percentage of purchases made on account (Aaronson, Bostic et al. 2004, see 
Table 4 pg. 60). 
 
To derive the coefficients for models #3 and # 5, Aaronson et al. used the 
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimation method.  
 
Relative to models # 3 and # 5, Aaronson et al. report the following two findings: 
 
? After controlling for firm size, owner and firm credit history, and industry 
classification, there was no evidence that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the use of trade credit between non-minority- and Hispanic-
owned firms (Aaronson, Bostic et al. 2004, pg. 61). 
 
? After controlling for firm size, owner and firm credit history, and industry 
classification, there was evidence that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the use of trade credit between non-minority- and Black-
owned firms.  Compared with Non-minority-owned firms, Black-owned 
firms that use trade credit have 10.5 fewer suppliers and make 6.4 percent 
fewer purchases on account (Aaronson, Bostic et al. 2004, pg. 61). 
 
Clearly, these findings suggest that even after controlling for industry and the 
creditworthiness of a firm and its owner, access to trade credit may vary with the 
race/ethnicity of the owner as a result of discrimination and/or other factors.  
However Aaronson et al. did not design their study to determine directly if the 
quantity of trade credit varies with the race/ethnicity of the owner.  Clearly, more 
research is needed to determine if the quantity of trade credit varies with the 
race/ethnicity of the owner. 
 
Now, we discuss an empirical study completed by Coleman30 [2003].   This is the 
only other empirical study that we have found that addresses in part the primary 
research questions to be addressed by our study.  As was true of the study by 
Aaronson et al., the Coleman study employs a SSBF dataset. 
 
The Coleman study attempts to identify the characteristics of those firms that are 
most likely to repay trade credit within the 'discount period' and of those firms 
which are most likely to pay late thus incurring late payment penalties.  Coleman 
refers to trade credit repaid within the 'discount period' as "Free" and trade credit 
repaid with late payment penalties as "Costly."  Using Coleman’s parlance, the 
primary purpose of the study can be restated as follows: to categorize the firms 
most likely to use ‘free’ trade credit and those most likely to use ‘costly’ trade 
credit. Coleman’s study compares the usage of trade credit by types of firms (i.e. 
                                            
30 Susan Coleman is currently an Associate Professor at the Barney School of Business, 
University of Hartford.  She has written numerous articles regarding the development and 
financing of small, women-owned firms University of Hartford (n.d.). www.hartford.edu, University 
of Hartford. 2004.. 
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firms owned by non-minority men, non-minority women, black men, Hispanic 
men or Asian-American men) using data from the 1998 SSBF.  
 
Among other things, the Coleman study includes estimations of regression 
models for determining if a firm either: (i) has any outstanding trade credit; or, (ii) 
has been denied trade credit during the period specified by the 1998 SSBF 
(Coleman 2003, pp. 9-10).  Both of these dependent variables are estimated 
using binomial logit models.  Table 6 (below) identifies both the dependent 
variable and independent variables for these two models estimated by Coleman. 
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Table 6.  Trade Credit Regression Model estimated by Coleman 
Access to Trade Credit as a function of Firm Owner’s Characteristics 
 Model A B 
  
Dependent 
Variable 
Ln (Trade Credit?) 
1= yes, firm has some 
0 = no, firm has none 
Ln (Denied Trade Credit?) 
1= Denied Trade Credit 
0= Not Denied Trade Credit 
  Coefficients Coeffici ents 
Intercept 1.0193** -2.2416** 
Owner’s Age -0.0154** -0.0107 
Education 0.1109 0.2937 
Experience 0.0188** -0.0192* 
Owner: White Women 
1= yes; 0 = no 
 
-0.4520** 
 
0.0073 
Owner: Black Men 
1= yes; 0 = no 
 
-0.5269** 
 
0.9517** 
Owner: Hispanic Men 
1= yes; 0 = no 
 
-0.7734** 
 
0.2236 
In
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Owner: Asian Men 
1= yes; 0 = no 
 
-0.1552 
 
-0.1950 
Notes: * results significant at the 0.05 level ** results significant at the 0.01 levels 
Source: (contents of in this table was derived from Table VI in Coleman 2003, pg. 
23) 
 
The regression estimates shown in Table 9 are based on observations for 3,252 
firms contained in the 1998 SSBF dataset.31  While the overall sample size is 
large, it contains a relatively small number of firms owned by minority women, 
therefore, no observations for firms owned by Black, Hispanic, or Asian women 
were analyzed (Coleman 2003, pg. 4). 
  
Based on analyses of the two models identified in Table 9, Coleman concluded 
the following: 
 
? Controlling for various measures of human capital (education, experience 
and age), firms owned by white women, black men, and Hispanic men 
were significantly less likely to have trade credit than firms owned by white 
men (Coleman 2003, pp. 10-11). 
 
? Controlling for various measures of human capital (education, experience 
and age), firms owned by black men were significantly more likely to be 
denied trade credit (Coleman 2003, pp. 10-11). 
 
                                            
31 In total, the 1998 SSBF dataset contains observations on 3,550. (see Table 6 on pg. 41 for 
more details about the composition of the 1998 dataset) 
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? Controlling for various measures of human capital (education, experience 
and age), firms owned by black men were significantly more likely to 
payoff trade credit late (Coleman 2003, pp. 10-11). 
 
Coleman does not specify and/or discuss a single model that controls for the 
creditworthiness of both the firm and the owner, and characteristics of the firm as 
well as owner.   As a result, it is impossible to determine from the Coleman study 
if the observed disparities arise from discrimination and/or other factors.  The 
preceding observation is not meant as a criticism.  The Coleman study was not 
designed to examine discrimination in access to trade credit.  The primary 
objective of the Coleman study is to characterize those firms that are most likely 
to use ‘free’ trade credit and those most likely to use ‘costly’ trade credit. 
 
Ultimately, the findings of Coleman and Aaronson et al. allow for the possibility of 
discrimination in access to trade credit and make it clear that little is known about 
how discrimination might impact access to trade credit for minority-owned firms.  
Our research study begins the process of addressing this gap in the literature 
directly.   
 
In the next section of this paper, our research methodology and results are 
presented. 
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4. Research Methodology and Results 
 
This study consists of a quantitative analysis of empirical data from the 1993 and 
1998 SSBF datasets.   
 
Our study falls into the “Fair Share Analyses” category and required the 
development of a regression model to estimate the amount of trade credit that a 
firm will receive after controlling industry and creditworthiness of the firm and 
owner. The applicable unit of analysis is the firm. 
  
While trade credit is an important source of financing for small businesses, little is 
known about how discrimination might impact access to trade credit for minority-
owned firms.  This study begins the process of addressing this issue by focusing 
on the following three research questions: 
 
? Is there any disparity in the quantity of trade credit extended to minority-
owned firms compared with non-minority-owned firms?  
? After controlling for creditworthiness, is there any disparity in the quantity 
of trade credit extended to firms owned by minorities compared with those 
owned by non-Hispanic whites? 
? If in fact disparities exist after controlling for creditworthiness, have these 
disparities narrowed over time? 
 
 
4.1. The Data 
 
The study examined data collected via 1993 and 1998 Survey of Small Business 
Finances (SSBF)32, co-sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. 
Small Business Administration.  The main purposes of the SSBF are to provide 
information on the use of credit by small and minority-owned firms and to create 
a general-purpose database on the finances of such firms.  The survey was 
structured to yield sufficient numbers of minority-owned firms to conduct separate 
analyses of minority- and non-minority-owned small businesses.  Survey 
datasets are generated approximately every five years, commencing with the 
year 1987 (U.S. Federal Reserve System 1996; Haggerty, Grigorian et al. 2001).  
The latest available dataset contains observations for the year 1998.  Table 7 on 
page 52 provides a breakdown of the racial/ethnic composition of the 1993 and 
1998 SSBF datasets. 
                                            
32 Formally, the two datasets are entitled the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances 
and the1998 Survey of Small Business Finances.  In this document, for ease of exposition, we 
refer to the two datasets as the 1993 SSBF dataset and the 1998 SSBF dataset. 
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Table 7.  Description of the 1993 & 1998 SSBF Datasets 
Description of the 1993 & 1998 SSBF Datasets  
(racial/ethnic breakdown of firm owners) 
 Survey Year/Dataset Title 1993/NSSBF 
(1) 
1998/SSBF 
(2) 
 Total # of Observations (a) 5,276 3,550
Non-Hispanic White (b)
 
4,045 2,790
 
Hispanic White (b)
 
326 243
Hispanic Other (c) 43 17
Hispanic, Total (b)  
 
369 260
Black (c) 523 273
Asian & Pacific Islander (c) 336 214Et
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American Indian & Native 
Alaskans (c)
45 24
 Year the dataset became 
publicly available 
 
1997 (d) 
 
2001
Sources: 
1)  (See Table 1 in Cole and Wolken 1995, pg. 632) 
2) (Derived from Table 2 in Bitler, Robb et al. 2001, pg. 186) 
Notes: 
(a) The sum of the various racial/ethnic categories of owners do not equal the “Total” 
because the observations reflected in the row labeled “Hispanic Other” are also 
included in the amounts shown for “Black, Asian & Pacific Islander or American 
Indian & Native Alaskan.”  
(b) Commencing with the 1990 Census, the U.S. Census Bureau considers ‘Hispanic’ 
to be an ethnic classification not a racial classification.  As a result, there are 
White Hispanics, Black Hispanics, Asian Hispanics, etc.  However, for the 
purposes of most government activities and agencies (e.g. the Small Business 
Administration), all Hispanics are considered minorities.  Prior to the 1990 Census, 
“Hispanic” was treated as a racial category. 
(c) The observations reflected in the row labeled “Hispanic Other” are also included 
in the amounts shown for “Black, Asian & Pacific Islander or American Indian 
& Native Alaskan.” 
(d) Author’s determination based on a note in a Federal Reserve Bulletin: (See Note 3 
in Cole and Wolken 1996, pg.984).  The current version of the Public-Use dataset 
became available in 1999 and only includes observations for 4,637 firms (U.S. 
Federal Reserve System 1999, pp. 1-4), 
 
The 1993 SSBF dataset includes information from approximately 5,30033 
completed interviews of a random sample of small businesses, with stratification 
by firm size, location (urban or rural), and geographic region of the country.    
                                            
33 A little more than fifty percent of the firms contacted responded  U.S. Federal Reserve System 
(1996). National Survey of Small Business Finances: Methodology Report. Washington, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System: 113.. 
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Included among the approximately 5,300 completed surveys are responses from 
523 African-American-owned firms, 336 Asian-American-owned firms, and 369 
Hispanic-owned firms.  The survey drew its sample from the population of all for-
profit, non-financial, non-farm business enterprises that were listed in Dun’s 
Market Identifier (DMI) file and that were in operation as of year-end 1992 with 
fewer than 500 employees.34  More than 14,000 firms were contacted, of which 
about 10,200 met the definition of small business as used in this study. 
 
The 1998 SSBF dataset includes information from approximately 3,55035 
completed interviews.  Included among those completed surveys are responses 
from 273 African-American-owned firms, 214 Asian-American-owned firms, and 
260 Hispanic-owned firms (Bitler, Robb et al. 2001, pp. 185-187). 
 
The data in both datasets are organized into four partitions: 
 
Main Partition: 
While this partition consists primarily of non-minority-owned firms, it does 
include minority firms.  As a result, it is referred to as the “Main Partition” as 
opposed to the “White Partition.” 
 
This partition includes 90 sampling strata defined by: 
? 9 Census Regions 
? Urban/Rural Businesses (2 groups) 
? 5 Size Groups (1-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-499 employees, and Unknown)  
 
African-American Partition: 
 
This partition contains two sampling strata: Urban/Rural Businesses. 
 
Asian-American Partition: 
 
This partition contains two sampling strata: Urban/Rural Businesses. 
 
Hispanic Partition: 
 
This partition contains two sampling strata: Urban/Rural Businesses. 
 
                                            
34 Dun’s Marketing Service, Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. The DMI list, containing nearly 10 million 
businesses, is broadly representative of all businesses but does not include many of the newest 
start-up firms or the self-employed individuals filing business tax returns. In contrast, the Internal 
Revenue Service reports that for 1991 about 20 million individuals filed business tax returns, 
including about 13 million sole proprietorships, of which about 3 million reported less than $2,500 
in annual receipts. 
35 Approximately 33% of the firms contacted responded Bitler, M. P., A. M. Robb, et al. (2001). 
Financial services used by small businesses: evidence from the 1998 Survey of Small Business 
Finances, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2002.. 
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A firm was classified as being owned by individuals of a specific race, ethnic 
group, or sex if more than 50 percent of the ownership shares belonged to such 
individuals during the survey period. 
 
The SSBF datasets include information on the availability and use of credit by 
small and minority-owned businesses. Both datasets provide detailed information 
on the types and sources of financial services used by small businesses, with 
emphasis on the use of credit. The SSBF datasets also contain information 
regarding each firm’s employment, assets, liabilities, equity, income and 
expenses; firm characteristics, including location, organizational form, and age; 
and demographic characteristics of each firm’s primary owner, including sex, 
age, education, experience, ethnicity, and race.  
 
For both the 1993 and 1998 datasets, business size is measured in three ways.  
For the 1993 dataset, the average number of full-time-equivalent employees for 
1993, revenues for fiscal year (FY) 1992, and year-end FY 1992 total assets. The 
employment size of the vast majority of firms in the population of small 
businesses is near the bottom of the 0–499 range. For 1993 dataset, nearly 70 
percent of firms employed fewer than five full-time-equivalent workers and only 3 
percent had more than fifty.  For the 1998 dataset, the frequency distribution for 
this variable is similar. 
 
For the 1993 dataset, size in terms of sales and assets reveals a similar skew in 
distribution.  For example, more than half of the firms reported revenues of less 
than $250,000, whereas fewer than 5 percent had annual revenues in excess of 
$5 million.  For the 1998 dataset, the frequency distribution for this variable is 
similar. 
 
A business can be organized as a corporation (C-type or S-type), a 
proprietorship, or a partnership.  For the 1993 dataset, most small businesses 
were organized as sole proprietorships.  Sole proprietorships accounted for more 
than 40 percent of firms.   About 30 percent were organized as “C” corporations, 
20 percent as “S” corporations, and the remainder as partnerships (Cole and 
Wolken 1995, pg. 631).  For the 1998 dataset, the proportion of firms that were 
organized as sole proprietorships was even higher.  Sole proprietorships 
accounted for approximately half of firms; “C” corporations accounted for about 
24 percent; “S” corporations accounted for 20 percent; and, the remainder were 
organized as partnerships (Bitler, Robb et al. 2001, pg.185). 
 
Firms were classified by industry using Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
system. For the 1993 dataset, the majority of firms (60 percent) were distributed 
among the business services, retail trade, and professional services industries. 
Only about ten percent were in manufacturing or transportation industries. (Cole 
and Wolken 1995, pg. 632)  The distribution of firms by industry was similar for 
the 1998 dataset (Bitler, Robb et al. 2001, pg. 186). 
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For both the 1993 and 1998 datasets, firms less than five years old (that is, 
whose current ownership had been in place less than five years) accounted for 
about 15 percent of the sample, as did firms twenty-five years old or older. More 
than one-quarter of all firms were between five and ten years old, and the mean 
value was 14.5 years (Cole and Wolken 1995, pg. 632; Bitler, Robb et al. 2001, 
pg. 186). 
 
For both the 1993 and 1998 datasets, about 80 percent of all small businesses 
were located in urban areas, with approximately 90 percent having a single office 
and an owner–manager. Fewer than one in ten small businesses reported export 
sales (Cole and Wolken 1995, pg. 632; Bitler, Robb et al. 2001, pg. 186). 
 
4.2. Our Study Sample 
 
The samples that we used to address our research questions were drawn from 
the SSBF datasets; however, they did not use all of the observations contained in 
the SSBF dataset.   For example, the 1998 SSBF dataset contains 3,561 
observations, and our 1998 study sample includes observations for 1,072 firms. 
Observations for firms in the following industries were excluded from our study 
sample: service; FIRE (financial services, insurance and real estate); and, 
mining.  Firms in these three industries were excluded because on average the 
compositions of their balance sheets differ significantly from those included in our 
sample.  The study sample also only included observations for firms that 
majority-owned by males.  The 1998 SSBF dataset only include observations for 
a small number of firms majority-owned by minority women.  So, to eliminate any 
possible influence of gender discrimination on any research findings, firms owned 
by women were excluded from our study sample.  Finally, our study sample only 
includes firms that sought trade credit during the 1998 to ensure that any 
observed disparity did not result from demand-side differences36.  Ultimately, the 
study sample consists of 1,072 observations for firms majority-owned by males 
active in one of the following five industries: construction, manufacturing, retail, 
transportation and wholesale. 
 
 
4.3. Methodology and Model 
 
                                            
36 The 1998 SSBF dataset includes responses to the following the question: “Did the firm 
purchase any goods or services on account during 1998 rather than pay for the purchase 
before or at the time of delivery?”  U.S. Federal Reserve System (2002). Codebook for 1998 
National Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF). Washington, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System: 147..  See Appendix A for a complete list of all variables employed by 
this study.  We recognize that excluding firms that were unsuccessful in obtaining any trade credit 
in 1998 potentially underestimating the full impact of discrimination; however, this is preferable to 
incorrectly attributing to discrimination disparities that result from minority-owned firms that did not 
request any trade credit during 1998. 
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With access to the SSBF data, we developed a model that allowed us to address 
the primary research question: “Is there empirical evidence of racial 
discrimination in the extension of trade credit?” 
 
To address this question, a measure of amount of trade credit provided to a firm 
that was sensitive to variation in the size of firms was needed.  Our model uses 
TC_PCT as the primary measure of the quantity of trade credit provided. TC_PCT 
measures the percentage of all of a firm’s purchases made with trade credit.  For 
example, if a firm was granted trade credit for all of its purchases, TC_PCT would 
equal 100% and if a firm was never granted trade credit, TC_PCT would equal 
0%.  The dependent variable (High_TC-use) used in our model is a dummy 
variable that identifies those firms whose use of trade credit (as measured by 
TC_PCT) equals or exceeds the median value for non-Hispanic white men.  
Consistent with prior research, we control for firm creditworthiness, industrial 
classification, owner’s human capital and/or owner’s creditworthiness. 
 
To identify the appropriate independent variables for this model, two separate 
bodies of research were reviewed. 
 
The first of these two bodies of research seeks to identify the factors that 
determine who receives trade credit (Emery 1984; Walker 1985; Chant and 
Walker 1988; Elliehausen and Wolken 1993; Peterson and Rajan 1997; Ng, 
Smith et al. 1999; Wilson 2002).  The second body of research seeks to 
determine if there is evidence of racial and/or gender discrimination in various 
credit markets (e.g. mortgage loans, consumer loans, etc.) (Becker 1971; 
Peterson and Peterson 1981; Handy and Swinton 1984; Ando 1988; Elliehausen 
and Lawrence 1990; Bates 1993; Dymski 1995; Munnell, Tootell et al. 1996; 
Bates 1997; Bates 1997; Kijakazi 1997; Blanchflower, Levine et al. 1998; Bostic 
and Lampani 1999; Immergluck 1999; Coleman 2000; Han 2001; Squires and 
O'Connor 2001; Cavalluzzo 2002).   
 
Based on a review of these two bodies of literature, a model was developed that 
allowed us to address the basic research question.  
 
A logistic regression model was crafted having the following form: 
 
iiii
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Logistic regression was used because the dependent variable (High_TC_use) is a 
dummy variable that identifies those firms whose use of trade credit is ‘high’ or 
‘low.’  Specifically, the dependent variable (High_TC-use) identifies those firms 
whose use of trade credit (as measured by TC_PCT) equals or exceeds the 
median value for non-Hispanic white men. 
 
  - 57 - 
Industry dummies are included in the model because prior research clearly 
demonstrates that terms and quantity of trade supplied vary significantly from 
industry to industry (Ng, Smith et al. 1999, pp. 1117-1119).  That said, within an 
industry, trade credit terms are generally quite uniform.  Typically, suppliers 
address variations in creditworthiness of their customers by vary the quantity of 
trade credit provided rather the terms (Chant and Walker 1988, pg. 864; Ng, 
Smith et al. 1999, pp. 1117-1119).  The base/reference industry is manufacturing 
for this model, therefore the coefficients for the other industry dummies indicate 
whether firms in that industry receive more or less trade credit than a 
manufacturing firm, ceteris paribus.  The model includes dummies for the 
following industries: construction, retail, transportation and wholesale.   It should 
be noted that the study sample excludes observations for the following industries: 
service; FIRE (financial services, insurance and real estate); and, mining.  Firms 
in these three industries were excluded because on average the compositions of 
their balance sheets differ significantly from those included in our sample. 
 
ORG, a dummy variable that identifies those firms set up as corporations or other 
limited liability entities, is included in our model because Petersen and Rajan 
(1997, pg. 679) have demonstrated that this a significant determinant of the 
amount of trade credit provided to small firms.  While no consensus exists on 
why firms organized as corporations and/or other limited liability entities are 
provided more trade credit on average than those organized as proprietorships 
and partnerships, several researchers suggest that the limited liabilities entities 
as a group may be more perceived by suppliers as more ‘sophisticated’ and  
‘established’ (Walker 1985, pg. 38; Coleman 2003, pg. 11). 
 
Variables (Ln_tot-ast_1 and Ln_F_age_2) that account for variation in a firm’s 
total assets and age are included in our model as measures of a firm’s 
creditworthiness.   The size of a firm (as measured by sales and total assets) is 
an important factor in assessing the firm’s creditworthiness.  Prior research 
provides evidence that both total assets and firm age are significant determinants 
of the amount of trade credit provided to small firms (Walker 1985, pg. 38; 
Peterson and Rajan 1997, pp. 678-679).  The preference for older firms is 
supported by evidence that a firm likelihood of failure drops with each passing 
year of operation (see Bates’ chapter, Financing Capital Structure and Small 
Business Viability, in Yazdipour 1991, pp. 63-77). 
 
The model also includes measures of the owner’s human capital (exp) and 
creditworthiness (SLOPAY_3).  Aaronson et al. (2004, pp. 46-48) suggest that as 
owners spend more time working in an industry and/or market, he or she may 
develop social capital with suppliers that increases their access to trade credit, 
ceteris paribus.  Cavaluzzo and Wolken (Cavalluzzo 2002) clearly demonstrate 
that the creditworthiness of firm owners is a significant determinant of whether 
small firms can obtain bank financing.  It seems reasonable that suppliers of 
trade credit also might conclude that the creditworthiness of the owner of a small 
firm should be a factor in their decision to provide trade credit to that firm. 
  - 58 - 
 
Finally, the model includes four race dummies to identify firms owned by African-
Americans, Hispanic whites, Asian-Americans and other minorities, respectively: 
aa_own, lat_own, asia_own and other_race.  The base/reference group is non-
Hispanic whites, therefore the coefficients for these race/ethnicity dummies 
indicate whether firms owned by that group receive more or less trade credit than 
non-Hispanic whites, ceteris paribus. 
 
4.4. Variables of Interests 
 
While the 1993 and 1998 SSBF datasets were not specifically designed to 
address this study’s central research question, they both contain detailed 
information on firm and owner characteristics required to address this question.  
The firm characteristics include the industrial classification, the firm’s age, 
measures of creditworthiness, information about the quantity, the nature and 
sources of the funds that capitalize a firm.  Owner data includes gender, 
ethnicity/race, management experience, education and past financial problems. 
 
Several of the questions in both the 1993 and 1998 SSBF address a firm’s use of 
trade credit, including: 
 
? Did the firm purchase any goods or services on account last year? 
? Has any supplier that offers trade credit denied a request by your firm? 
? From how many suppliers did the firm make purchases on account during 
1993 or 1998? 
? What percentage of purchases was made on account in 1993 or 1998? 
? What portion of suppliers offered cash discounts for prompt payment? 
? What portion of the cash discount offered did the firm take advantage of? 
? What portion of payments on account was made after the due date in 
1993 or 1998? 
 
On page 59, Table 8 lists most of the variables to be used in this study.  Some of 
the variables shown on the next page are those used in the SSBF datasets and 
others variables were derived for this study using one or more of the variables 
contained in the SSBF datasets.  (Appendix A contains a complete list of the 
variables used in this study and also identifies the corresponding variable names 
for the 1993 and 1998 SSBF datasets) 
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Table 8.  An Abridged Variable Dictionary 
An Abridged Variable Dictionary (a) 
Type Variable Name Variable Description/Definition Row 
 
TC_High_use 
Identifies those firms whose use of trade credit (as 
measured by TC_PCT) equals or exceeds the 
median value for non-Hispanic white men (dummy) 
 
1 
D
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TC_PCT Measures the percentage of all of a firm’s purchases 
made with trade credit. 
 
2 
aa_own Identifies firms owned by African-Americans 
(dummy) 
3 
lat_own Identifies firms owned by Hispanic whites (dummy) 4 
asia_own Identifies firms owned by Asian-American (dummy) 5 
O
w
ne
r’s
 R
ac
e 
non_min_own Identifies firms owned by non-Hispanic whites 
(dummy) 
6 
 
exp 
 
Owner’s management experience (measured in 
years) 
 
7 
O
w
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r 
C
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SLOPAY_3 
Identifies # of an Owner with three or more personal 
accounts that were 60 days or more past due within 
the past 3 years (dummy) 
 
8 
SIC_C Identifies firms engaged in Construction (dummy)  9 
SIC_Mfg Identifies firms engaged in Manufacturing (dummy) 10 
SIC_R Identifies firms engaged in Retail (dummy) 11 
SIC_T Identifies firms engaged in Transportation (dummy) 12 
SIC_W Identifies firms engaged in Wholesale  (dummy) 13 
In
du
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 F
irm
 In
fo
 
ORG Identifies corporations and other limited liability 
entities (dummy) 
14 
F_age Years since firms was started/purchased/acquired by 
current management 
15 
Ln_F_age_2 Ln (F_age squared) 16 
tot_ast Total Assets at fiscal year-end 1998 17 
 
tot_ast_1 
Total Assets at fiscal year-end 1998 (excluding firms 
with negative values which not indicative of going 
concerns) 
18 
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Ln_tot_ast_1 Ln(tot_ast_1) 19 
(a) This is table contains most the variables that will be used to conduct this study. For a 
more complete list see Appendix A. 
 
 
4.5. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The first of our three research questions asks, ‘Is there any disparity in the 
quantity of trade credit extended to minority-owned firms compared with those 
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owned by non-Hispanic whites?’  To address that question, we looked at the use 
of trade credit by firms owned by non-Hispanic white, African-Americans, 
Hispanic whites and Asian-Americans, respectively, to determine if there were 
any statistically significant differences in their levels of use.  In other words, we 
determined the mean value of the dependent variable (TC_High_use) and a few 
other measures of trade credit use and tested for any statistically significant 
differences in the values for firms owned by African-Americans, Hispanic whites 
and Asian-Americans relative to those owned by non-Hispanic whites. 
 
Similarly, we also calculated the mean values for the various independent 
variables that were used to assess a firm’s creditworthiness, industry 
classification, owner’s creditworthiness or owner’s human capital.  And, for each 
of these independent variables, we tested for any statistically significant 
differences in the values for firms owned by African-Americans, Hispanic whites 
and Asian-Americans relative to those owned by non-Hispanic whites. 
 
For expositional ease, the variables are grouped into four categories: firm 
characteristics; industrial classifications; owner’s characteristics; and, use of 
trade credit. 
 
 
4.5.1. Firm Characteristics 
 
Table X reveals that the firms owned by non-Hispanic white men are significantly 
larger than those owned by minorities as measured by sales or total assets.  
These disparities are of interest because size is a primary indicator of 
creditworthiness and therefore a principal determinant of if and how much trade 
credit a firm will receive.  The sales of firms owned by Hispanic white men and 
African-American men average approximately one-third of those of non-Hispanic 
white men.  Similarly, the total assets of firms owned by Hispanic white men and 
African-American men average approximately one-fourth of those of non-
Hispanic white men.  Comparing firms owned by Asian-Americans with those 
owned by non-Hispanic whites, no statistically significant differences were 
observed for either sales or total assets. 
 
 
4.5.2. Industrial Classifications and Organizational form 
 
Only a few noteworthy differences were observed relative to the distribution of 
firms across industrial classifications.  Firms owned by Hispanic men or Asian-
American men were significantly less likely to be involved in the construction field 
than those owned by non-Hispanic white men.  Whereas, firms owned by 
African-Americans were significantly less likely to be wholesalers than those 
owned by non-Hispanic whites. 
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4.5.3. Owner Characteristics 
 
One measure of human capital is years of management experience (exp).  No 
significant differences were observed in the level of management experience 
between non-Hispanic whites, African-Americans and Hispanic whites.  However, 
on average non-Hispanic whites had almost twice as much management 
experience as Asian-Americans. 
 
One measure of an owner’s creditworthiness is their payment history relative to 
their personal debts.  The variable SLOPAY_3 identifies those owners who have 
been late (60 days or more) on three or more personal obligations.  Using this 
measure, no significant differences were observed in the level of creditworthiness 
between non-Hispanic whites, African-Americans and Hispanic whites.  However, 
on average non-Hispanic whites were ten times more likely to be delinquent on 
their debts than Asian-Americans. 
 
 
4.5.4. Use of Trade Credit 
 
Table X we report the mean values for two variables: TC_PCT and High_TC_yes.   
TC_PCT measures the percentage of all of a firm’s purchases made with trade 
credit.  For example, if a firm was granted trade credit for all of its purchases, 
TC_PCT would equal 100% and if a firm was never granted trade credit, TC_PCT 
would equal 0%.  As measured by TC_PCT, firms owned non-Hispanic white men 
were granted trade credit for a significantly higher percentage of their purchases 
than those owned by either African-American men, Hispanic white men or Asian-
American men.  The variable High_TC-use is a dummy variable that identifies 
those firms whose use of trade credit (as measured by TC_PCT) equals or 
exceeds the median value for non-Hispanic white men.  As measured by 
High_TC-use, the use of trade credit by firms owned African-American men did 
not differ significantly from those owned by non-Hispanic white men.  However, 
significant differences were observed for firms owned by Hispanic white men and 
Asian-American men relative to those owned by non-Hispanic white men.  Using 
High_TC_use as a measure, the use of trade credit by non-Hispanic white men 
was roughly twice that observed for firms owned by either Hispanic white men or 
Asian-American men.   
 
The finding that firms owned by Asian-American men received significantly less 
trade credit (as measured by TC_PCT and High_TC_use) than those owned by 
non-Hispanic white men is noteworthy because many scholars suggest that 
Asian-Americans do not experience difficulties in accessing credit comparable to 
those experienced by other minorities (Chen and Cole 1988; Bates 1989, pp. 25-
42; Bates 1993; Bates 1993; Bates 1997; Christopher 1998). 
 
To summarize, we observed that there were some significant differences in 
access to trade credit for firms owned by minorities compared with those owned 
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by non-Hispanic white men.  We also observed that firms owned by non-Hispanic 
white men were larger (as measured by sales or total assets) than those owned 
by either African-American men or Hispanic white men.  However, no significant 
differences in size were observed between firms owned by non-Hispanic white 
men and Asian-American men.  Turning to industrial classifications, we observed 
some significant differences in the level of participation in various industries by 
firms owned by African-American men, Hispanic white men and Asian-American 
men relative to those owned by non-Hispanic white men.  Continuing we 
observed that non-Hispanic men had significantly more business experience than 
either Hispanic white men or Asian-American men.  However, no significant 
differences in management experience were observed between firms owned by 
non-Hispanic white men and African-American men.  Turning to owner’s 
creditworthiness, no significant differences were observed between non-Hispanic 
white men and African-American men or Hispanic white men.  In contrast, Asian-
American men were found to be significantly more creditworthy than non-
Hispanic white men as measured by SLOPAY_3. 
 
This review of the descriptive statistics for access to trade credit provides an 
answer to first of our three research questions: ‘Is there any disparity in the 
quantity of trade credit extended to minority-owned firms compared with those 
owned by non-Hispanic whites?’  Clearly, the answer is ‘yes.’ 
 
So this brings us to the second research question: ‘After controlling for 
creditworthiness and other salient factors, is there any disparity in the quantity of 
trade credit extended to firms owned by minorities compared with those owned 
by non-Hispanic whites?’ 
 
In the next section, we will discuss the model used to test for differences in 
access to trade credit between firms owned by non-Hispanic whites men and 
those owned by either African-American men, Hispanic white men and Asian-
American men after controlling for firm creditworthiness, industrial classification, 
owner’s human capital and/or owner’s creditworthiness. 
 
 
4.6. Hypotheses 
 
Our second research question can be formally stated as a hypothesis.  Prior to 
doing so, it would be helpful to revisit the model that we developed.  A logistic 
regression model was crafted having the following form: 
 
iiii
iiii
iiiiii
raceotherownasiaownlat
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______
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543210
 
 
Logistic regression was used because the dependent variable (High_TC_use) is a 
dummy variable that identifies those firms whose use of trade credit is ‘high’ or 
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‘low.’  Specifically, the dependent variable (High_TC-use) identifies those firms 
whose use of trade credit (as measured by TC_PCT) equals or exceeds the 
median value for non-Hispanic white men. 
 
Stated formally, we tested the following hypothesis, for firms owned by African-
Americans: 
  
And, we tested the following hypothesis for firms owned by Hispanic whites: 
 
And, we tested the following hypothesis for firms owned by Asian-Americans: 
 
 
In the next section, we report the findings of our analysis. 
 
0: 110 ≥βH
0: 11 <βAH
0: 100 ≥βH
0: 10 <βAH
0: 120 ≥βH
0: 12 <βAH
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4.7. Empirical Results 
 
The results of our analysis of factors influencing the quantity of trade credit 
provided to a firm is outline in Table 9.  All of the reported coefficients carry the 
expect signs that prior research would suggest. 
 
Table 9.  Logistic Regression: Estimates of Trade Credit Use 
Dependent Variable: TC_High_use  
{a dummy variable that identifies those firms whose use of trade credit (as 
measured by  TC_PCT) equals or exceed s the m edian valu e for n on-
Hispanic white men} 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Coefficient
Wald 
Statistic
Significance
p value 
 
EXP (B) 
Industry 
SIC_C  0.684** 12.863 .000 1.981 
SIC_R -0.214  1.345 .246 0.807 
SIC_T -0.491  2.367 .124 0.612 
SIC_W  0.620**  8.055 .005 1.859 
Organizational Form 
ORG  0.340*  5.651 .017 1.405 
Firm Creditworthiness 
Ln_tot_ast_1  0.078*  5.756 .016 1.081 
Ln_F_age_2  0.119*  4.917 .027 1.126 
Owner’s Characteristics 
Exp  0.015*  4.097 .043 1.015 
SLOPAY_3 -0.290  1.104 .293 0.748 
Race/Ethnicity of Owner 
aa_own -0.503  1.495 .221 0.605 
lat_own -0.706  3.667 .055 0.494 
asia_own -0.811*  3.868 .049 0.444 
Other_race -1.220*   4.826 .028 0.295 
 
Constant -1.863 18.274 .000 0.155 
N = 1,072 
* differences from Non-Hispanic, White men significant at the .05 level 
**   differences from Non-Hispanic, White men significant at the .01 level 
 
 
The coefficient for ORG (which identifies firms organized as corporations or other 
limited liability entities) is positive and significant. 
 
The coefficients associated with both of the measures of firm creditworthiness 
(Ln_tot_ast_1 and Ln_F_age_2) are positive and significant. 
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The coefficient associate exp (owner’s management experience in years) is 
positive and significant. 
 
While the coefficient associate SLOPAY_3 (a measure of a owner’s 
creditworthiness) is positive, it is not significant the 5% level. 
 
The primary purpose of this study was determined if race/ethnicity significantly 
influences the amount of trade credit provided to a firm, ceteris paribus.  The 
results are mixed and not completely consistent with prior research. 
 
While the coefficient for aa_own (which identifies firms owned by African-
Americans) is negative as prior research would suggest, it is not significant. 
 
The same can be said of lat_own.  While the coefficient for lat_own (which 
identifies firms owned by Hispanic whites) is negative as prior research would 
suggest, it also is not significant. 
 
Interestingly, the coefficient associated with asia_own offer strong evidence of 
that firms owned by Asian-Americans received less trade credit those owned by 
non-Hispanic whites, ceteris paribus.  The coefficient associated with asia_own is 
negative and significant. 
 
The finding that firms owned by Asian-American men received significantly less 
trade credit than those owned by non-Hispanic white men is noteworthy because 
many scholars suggest that Asian-Americans do not experience difficulties in 
accessing credit comparable to those experienced by other minorities (Chen and 
Cole 1988; Bates 1989, pp. 25-42; Bates 1993; Bates 1993; Bates 1997; 
Christopher 1998). 
 
To quantify the disparity, we calculated the mean probability of being provided a 
‘high’ level of trade credit for firms owned by non-Hispanic white men and Asian-
American men37.  The probability of being provided a high level of trade credit for 
non-Hispanic white men is 62%.  For firms owned by Asian-Americans, the 
probability of being provided a high level of trade credit is 32% 
 
One way to quantity the portion of the disparity directly attributable to the 
race/ethnicity of the owner is to calculate the probability of being provided a ‘high’ 
level of trade credit for firms owned by Asian-American men if the mean values of 
those firms were identical to those of non-Hispanic white men.  When we do that 
the probability for firms owned by Asian-American men rises from 32% to 42%; 
however, it still falls well below the 62% probability rate for firms owned by non-
Hispanic white men. 
 
                                            
37 To calculate these values, the mean values for each group were plugged into the logistic 
regression model and the reported probabilities for the dependent variable (TC_High_use) are 
the end result of that exercise. 
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 At the onset of this study, a third research question was posed: ‘If in fact 
disparities in the amounts of trade credit provided to firms owned by minorities 
versus those owned by non-Hispanic whites did exist in 1998, ceteris paribus, 
have these disparities narrowed over time?’  To address this third questions, we 
had proposed to analyze the 1993 SSBF dataset with the same model that we 
used to analyze the 1998 SSBF dataset and determine if there were any 
statistically significant disparities in the quantity of trade credit extended in 1993 
to firms owned by minorities compared with those owned by non-Hispanic whites.  
If so, we could address the third research question: ‘Did the disparities in the 
amounts of trade credit provided to firms owned by minorities versus those 
owned by non-Hispanic whites narrow during the period from 1993 to 1998? 
 
Our analysis of the 1998 study sample did not reveal any statistically significant 
disparity in the provision of trade credit to firms owned by either African-American 
men or Hispanic white men compared with firms owned by non-Hispanic white 
men, ceteris paribus.  So, for these two groups, the third research question 
cannot be addressed. 
 
Our analysis of the 1998 study sample does reveal a statistically significant 
disparity in the provision of trade credit to firms owned by Asian-American men 
compared with firms owned by non-Hispanic white men, ceteris paribus.  So for 
this group, the third research question should be addressed.  Unfortunately, our 
study design did not anticipate this finding and we did not include observations 
for firms owned by Asian-Americans in the 1993 study sample.  So, this analysis 
must be deferred. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
Our examination of various descriptive statistics that measure access to trade 
credit clearly demonstrates that on average firms owned by minorities receive 
less trade credit than those owned by non-Hispanic white men.  Our analysis 
also indicates that most if not all of the observed disparities for firms owned by 
African-Americans and Hispanic whites compared with those owned non-
Hispanic whites can be attributed to differences in either firm creditworthiness, 
owner’s human capital and/or distribution by industry.  For firms owned by Asian-
Americans, this is not the case.  Significant disparities in access to trade credit 
remain after controlling for firm creditworthiness, owner’s human capital and 
distribution by industry for firms owned by Asian-American men compared with 
those owned non-Hispanic white men 
 
But does the evidence suggest that prejudicial discrimination is the cause of the 
observed disparities.  While our findings are consistent with the existence of 
prejudicial behavior, other factors may also explain these findings.  For example, 
the Asian-American business community may include a significant percentage of 
owners for whom English is not their first language.  If so, the associated 
language barriers may retard the development of relationships with some 
suppliers who are non-Hispanic whites, and thereby limit access to trade credit 
for firms owned by Asian-Americans.  The preceding comment is pure 
speculation and the SSBF datasets do not contain any observations regarding 
the language skills of firm owners.  However, this armchair exercise does 
illustrate that there may be other explanations that account for these findings.  
Clearly, more research is required. 
 
Like all empirical research, this study has some limitations.  One of these 
limitations involves sample selection.  We estimated a model using data that 
included observations for firms in five different industries.  Prior research clearly 
demonstrates that terms and quantity of trade supplied vary significantly from 
industry to industry (Ng, Smith et al. 1999, pp. 1117-1119).  That said, within an 
industry, trade credit terms are generally quite uniform.  Typically, suppliers 
address variations in creditworthiness of their customers by vary the quantity of 
trade credit provided rather the terms (Chant and Walker 1988, pg. 864; Ng, 
Smith et al. 1999, pp. 1117-1119).  This suggests that it would be preferable to 
estimate models for each industry separately because the coefficients associated 
with various model variables (e.g. measure of firm creditworthiness) might differ 
significantly from industry to industry.  Unfortunately, the SSBF datasets do not 
contain sufficient numbers of observations for minority-owned firms to allow one 
to safely infer much about the population of minority-owned businesses for most 
industries.  If and when appropriate datasets are available, industry specific 
samples clearly would be preferable. 
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Some readers of our findings might have an additional concern about the sample 
used to complete this study.  The sample analyzed only includes firms that had 
successfully obtained at least one dollar of trade credit in 1998.  The sample 
excluded firms that may have sought trade credit in 1998 and received none; 
thereby, potentially underestimating the full impact of discrimination.  So, our 
findings must be viewed in that light. 
   
In sum, our findings must be interpreted with some cautions given the limitations 
outlined.  That said, our findings are consistent with the existence of prejudicial 
behavior and make it difficult to dismiss this possibility for now. 
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